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ABSTRACT

Techniques exist for assessment, modeling, and simulation of physical and cyber infrastructures, respectively; but such isolated analysis is incapable of fully capturing the interdependencies that occur when they intertwine to create a cyber-physical
system (CPS). The ﬁrst contribution of this doctoral research includes qualitative
representation of the operation of a CPS in a single multi-agent model. Dependable
operation of a CPS is contingent upon correct interpretation of data describing the
state of the system. To this end, we propose agent-based semantic interpretation
services that extract useful information from raw sensor data. We utilize the summary schemas model to reconcile diﬀerences in data resolution, syntax, and semantics;
and to facilitate imprecise query of databases that maintain historical information,
including failure mitigation techniques.
Another contribution of the research is in developing ontologies that enable
automated reasoning in the classiﬁcation and mitigation of failures in CPS operation.
As a measure of dependability, we quantify the eﬀectiveness of our proposed ontologybased approach in identifying correct mitigation techniques. Our methodology and
models are applicable to a broad range of CPSs; however, they are described in the
context of intelligent water distribution networks (WDNs), which are cyber-physical
critical infrastructure systems responsible for reliable delivery of potable water. We
illustrate the use of game theory in agent-based decision support for allocation of water. As a precursor to empirical validation with ﬁeld data, we developed an integrated
cyber-physical WDN simulator using EPANET and MATLAB, and illustrate the use
of this simulator in validating our agent-based model and ontology-based approach
to automated mitigation of failure.
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INTRODUCTION

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are the integration of computation, as manifested by embedded computers and communication networks, with physical processes [1], [2]. In CPSs, sensors collect information about the physical operation of
the system, and communicate this information in real time to the computers and
embedded systems used for intelligent control. These cyber components use computational intelligence to process the information and determine appropriate control
settings for physical components of the system, such as devices used to control the
ﬂow of a physical commodity, e.g., water or electric power, on a line.
A fundamental challenge in research related to CPSs is modeling of these
systems. Accurate representation of a CPS encompasses three aspects: computing,
communication, and the physical infrastructure. Fundamental diﬀerences exist between the attributes of cyber and physical components, signiﬁcantly complicating
representation of their behavior with a single comprehensive model (or simulation
tool) [3]. Specialized models and simulation tools exist for the engineering domains
represented in critical infrastructure; including power, water, and transportation [4].
These models and tools have been created with the objective of accurately reﬂecting
the operation of the physical system, at high spatial and temporal resolution. Intelligent control is not captured, leaving these models incapable of representing CPSs.
Ideally, a single model would encompass both the physical and cyber system
semantics of a CPS in a meaningful way, such that the eﬀects of a speciﬁc event
are reﬂected in the reaction of either a cyber or a physical component of the system. Interdependencies among the cyber and physical components, in operation and
failure, present a major challenge, as they invalidate simpliﬁed models that assume
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components fail independently [5]. This hampers study of the reliability of CPSs an urgent task, given the increasing use of cyber control in critical infrastructures.
The research presented in this dissertation rises to the challenge of developing models and simulation techniques that capture cyber-physical interdependencies,
while accurately reﬂecting the operation and attributes of the cyber and physical infrastructures. More speciﬁcally, the goal is to develop techniques for qualitative and
quantitative characterization of the eﬀect of introducing “intelligence” to physical
infrastructure systems, in terms of reliability.
Agent-based modeling is the foundation of this doctoral research, which began
with qualitative representation of the operation of a CPS, as a precursor to quantitative modeling. An agent is deﬁned as an independent entity capable of making
decisions based on information from its environment [6]. Agents can bridge the gap
between the cyber and physical layers of a CPS, by serving as stewards for information
representing attributes of both layers. An agent-based model can represent diverse
characteristics and behaviors at high resolution, a feature essential to capturing the
intricacies of a CPS [7].
In this dissertation, a CPS has been modeled as a multi-agent system, where
each agent is an independent entity that manages resources within its local scope.
The CPS used as a case study is an intelligent water distribution network (WDN),
where physical components; e.g., valves, pipes, and reservoirs, are coupled with the
hardware and software that support intelligent water allocation. Figure 1.1 depicts a
sample WDN.
In brief, the goal of this doctoral research is to model, analyze, and mitigate
failures in CPSs, with water distribution selected as the application domain. Based
on investigation of studies on hydraulics, as well as knowledge of potential computing failures, we have identiﬁed and categorized potential failures and corresponding
mitigation techniques for a WDN, as depicted in Figs. 1.2 and 1.3, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Cyber and physical components of a WDN.

This dissertation describes the following original research contributions (listed
in chronological order), which have been published in seven refereed conference publications, two book chapters, and two journal papers.
1. Development of an integrated CPS simulator for WDNs, using EPANET [8]
and MATLAB to represent the physical infrastructure and the decision support
algorithms used to control the allocation of water, respectively [9].
2. Development of a qualitative multi-agent model for WDNs, which represents
both physical and cyber infrastructures of the CPS [10].
3. Reﬁnement of the multi-agent WDN model to represent semantic interpretation
of raw data [11, 12].

4

Figure 1.2: Failure modes of a WDN.

4. Development of a Markov chain model for WDNs, and use of this model in
quantitative analysis of non-functional system properties; e.g., reliability, mean
time to failure [13].
5. Enhancement of the qualitative model to address semantic heterogeneity and
facilitate imprecise query of data sources [14].
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Figure 1.3: Failure mitigation techniques for a WDN.

6. Investigation and simulation of game theory as an algorithmic tool for decision
support in WDNs [15], [16].
7. Deﬁnition of an ontology to facilitate automated decision support for WDNs
[17], [18].
8. Investigation of the eﬃcacy of failure mitigation using the deﬁned ontology [19].

6

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
review of related literature. Section 3 describes our approach to agent-based modeling of WDNs and presents quantitative analysis and simulation techniques for these
systems. Ontologies that reﬂect various aspects of the semantic relationships among
components in a WDN are presented in Section 4, where we also present the use of
these ontologies in automated failure mitigation. As an illustration of the utility of
our proposed technique, Section 5 describes and validates an agent-based environmental decision support system that employs game theory to guide water allocation.
We conclude with Section 6, which proposes avenues for future extensions to this
research.
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2

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A signiﬁcant problem in the study of dependability in CPSs in general, and
critical infrastructure systems in particular, is characterizing the interdependencies
between their cyber and physical components. System complexity has been cited as
the main challenge [20]. Other challenges include the low probability of occurrence
of critical events, diﬀerences in time scales associated with various events, and the
diﬃculty of gathering the data needed for accurate modeling.
A number of modeling and simulation techniques for critical infrastructure
are enumerated in [4]. Among these techniques, agent-based models are of particular interest to this doctoral research, as they are capable of capturing component
interactions in an accurate, yet simple, fashion. The need for agent-based modeling
of distributed complex systems has been investigated in [7]. The availability and
reliability of agent-based systems - both signiﬁcant concerns - are discussed in [21].
The Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML), as a formal speciﬁcation language with precise semantics, has been adopted to model agent-based systems, as demonstrated in
detail in [22]. In this doctoral research, we have utilized UML 2.0 to construct an
agent-based model that qualitatively captures static and dynamic aspects of a CPS.
Existing modeling techniques for CPSs rely upon semantics to represent the
relationship between the cyber and physical components of a CPS. The majority of
existing models for CPSs are qualitative in nature. One of very few existing quantitative models is presented in [23], where the Markov imbedded systems technique is used
to model reliability of a smart (power) grid, based on knowledge of cascading failures
in the system. The existence of data about these cascading failures allows the study
to begin from a more advanced stage than was possible for the research described in
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this dissertation. However, our work shares the goal of characterizing and predicting the operation and failure of a CPS, based on understanding the domain-speciﬁc
semantics of the system.
The reliability of WDNs, from a purely physical point of view, has long been a
topic of interest to the civil engineering community, and is critical to semantic understanding of the physical side of the CPS in focus for this dissertation. Salient studies
include work on inoperability modeling [24], which we have used as a basis for analyzing the reliability of the physical infrastructure. Our research encompasses both cyber
and physical aspects of WDNs, and supplements the probabilistic models developed for
the physical layer with quantitative data gathered by the cyber components.
From the engineering implementation perspective, semantic agent technologies
are typically closely associated with sensor networks, and several prototype systems
and software architectures have been proposed based on the combination of the two.
A prototype for battleﬁeld information systems has been described in [25], where the
stated goal is to dynamically integrate sensor networks with information fusion processes to support real-time sensing, interpretation, and decision-making in a tactical
environment. In [26], an architecture and programming model has been presented
for a semantic service-oriented sensor information platform. In contrast to [26], our
work expands the semantic service model to a semantic agent framework, whereas [26]
focuses on how to use the semantic model to query the system for high-level events
without processing raw sensed signals. The use of autonomous semantic agents in
developing a new software architecture for distributed processing environments has
been proposed in [27]. The discussion in [27] involves software architecture in general,
and utilizes semantic web technologies; whereas our work is tailored to the speciﬁc
requirements of CPSs.
The complexity of CPSs, as well as the necessity of capturing embedded computing and communication capabilities motivate the use of distributed agents and
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semantic services for representing the relationship between the cyber and physical
infrastructures. In our work, the distributed semantic agent model represents the
augmentation of data acquisition by sensors in the CPS with decision-making intelligence. To our knowledge, our work is the ﬁrst application of semantic agents to
modeling of CPSs.
Several challenges to the development of a generic framework for the design,
modeling, and simulation of CPSs are articulated in [28]. Features described as
desirable for such a framework include the integration of existing simulation tools,
reusability of software, and graphical representation of the modeling and simulation
environment. Our proposed integrated simulator meets these criteria.
The study most closely related to our proposed simulation method is [29],
where a method is proposed for integration of the ns-2 network simulator with the
Modelica framework, a modeling language for large-scale physical systems. The study
highlights the challenge of two-way synchronization of the simulators. The key difference between this study and our work is that we link to a specialized simulator
capable of accurately representing the operation of the physical infrastructure - in this
case a WDN, at high resolution.
In a WDN, heterogeneous sensor networks and related databases create a multidatabase platform that provides data to the semantic services, which in turn provide
information to decision support algorithms. One of the goals of multidatabase platforms is to provide transparent and uniform access to heterogeneous data sources [30].
The summary schemas model (SSM) has been designed to fulﬁll this objective at low
cost [30, 31, 32], while preserving local autonomy and oﬀering scalability. SSM enables automatic identiﬁcation of semantically similar/dissimilar data that have diﬀerent/same names and representations. This identiﬁcation is carried out very eﬃciently,
to the point where in some instances, in spite of their higher complexity, imprecise
queries can be carried out faster than precise queries [31]. Among the many beneﬁts
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of SSM, its support for imprecise queries is of greatest relevance to our work, as it
relaxes constraints on the form and vocabulary of database queries.
Experts diﬀer on their deﬁnitions of “ontology,” but every deﬁnition we have
encountered concurs that an ontology is a representation of entities and the relationships among them [33]. A deﬁnition given in [34] characterizes an ontology as the
speciﬁcation of conceptualizations that are used to help computers and humans share
knowledge. The semantic web and social network research communities have been
especially proliﬁc in their use of ontologies [35], [36]. Two well-known examples are
Friend of a Friend (FOAF) [37] and Flink [38], which have been used to analyze social
networks, discover communities of practice [39], and explore “hot” topics [40]. Recent
applications of ontologies in automated reasoning include their use in improving situational awareness [41]. We adopt ontologies to reﬂect various aspects of the semantic
relationships among components in the WDN and apply automated reasoning on these
ontologies to classify and mitigate failures.
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3

MODELING, ANALYSIS, AND SIMULATION OF WDNS

This section lays the groundwork for the remainder of the dissertation by
presenting qualitative modeling and quantitative analysis of WDNs. We propose a
multi-agent qualitative model, based on knowledge of the composition and functionality of a WDN. This model was validated using behavior-based simulation, and served
as a basis for subsequent quantitative analysis of WDN reliability. The extension of
the initial qualitative model includes semantic interpretation of sensor data in the
WDN, and the use of SSM to reconcile semantic heterogeneity and facilitate imprecise query of data sources. We also developed an integrated WDN simulator capable
of reﬂecting both cyber and physical aspects and utilized this simulator in validation
of our models and methods. In the interest of readability, an overview of the qualitative and quantitative models and a simple simulation are presented here; details are
deferred to Appendices A through C.
The qualitative analysis was published in the Proceedings of the 5th IEEE
Workshop on Engineering Semantic Agent Systems (ESAS) [11]; and as a book chapter [12]. An expanded version of the quantitative analysis will appear in the International Journal of Performability Engineering [13]. The integrated cyber-physical
simulator was published in the Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference
on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC ’09) [9]. The application of
SSM was published in the Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International Heterogeneity
in Computing Workshop (HCW) [14].

3.1 QUALITATIVE MODELING OF A WDN
For any system, qualitative modeling is a necessary precursor to quantitative
analysis. In this subsection, we present a qualitative model for a typical WDN, with
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the goal of capturing the interaction between the cyber and physical infrastructures.
We use UML to represent this model, due to the precise semantics oﬀered by this
formal speciﬁcation language.
Our work aims to accurately model a CPS as a multi-agent system, where each
agent is an independent entity that manages resources within its local scope. The
fundamental feature of an agent is its capability of making independent decisions,
which deﬁnes agents as active, rather than purely passive entities [42]. Typically, an
agent has the attributes of discreteness, autonomy, speed, repeatability, intelligence,
ﬂexibility, and situation-awareness [42, 43]. An agent is capable of perceiving its environment, acting on that perception, and interacting with other agents. Agents are
diverse, heterogenous, and dynamic in their behavioral rules and attributes. Behavioral rules for agents vary in granularity, sophistication, information load for decision
making, and the extent of memory of past events retained by the agent for its future
decision making. As a result, the agent-based paradigm is very well-suited to representation of complex heterogenous systems. In a WDN, the agent-based approach
oﬀers a dependable, distributed method for managing water resource allocation, enforcing system rules, and responding to unexpected events.
Creating a use case diagram is the ﬁrst step for qualitative system analysis.
A use case captures the interaction of a number of external actors with the system
towards accomplishment of a goal, which in our case is the provision of potable
water. Figure 3.1 shows an actor and use cases involved in a WDN, where each use
case represents one functionality in the model. The blue circles highlight the sources
of heterogeneity in the WDN, which are of particular relevance to the discussion of
Section 3.4, where we elaborate on the use of SSM for reconciling this heterogeneity.
This use case diagram can be readily generalized to other CPSs whose main goal
is management of a physical commodity. Examples include smart power grids and
intelligent transportation systems.
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Figure 3.1: Use case diagram for a WDN.

The CPS agent is the actor in the use case diagram, and associated with the
decision support algorithm. The agent accesses the system on behalf of an entity
and queries the various data sources available, e.g., sensor networks and databases
with historical records. For simplicity, only use cases associated with one agent are
shown in Fig. 3.1; all other agents have similar use cases associated with them.
As shown in Fig. 3.1, sensors collect information about the physical operation of
the system on a time- or event-triggered basis. As sensors collect data from diﬀerent
areas, the events may occur sporadically, and the data may be represented in diﬀerent
formats, signiﬁcant heterogeneity is likely to exist in the data. Heterogeneous data
with diﬀerences in format and scale is collected by sensors and sent for Data Integrity
Check, which is a stage of intelligent semantic inference.
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The Data Integrity Check use case utilizes three main data streams to identify
corrupt or invalid sensor data; speciﬁcally, i) real-time data from nearby sensors for the
same or related physical attributes, ii) information about the physical infrastructure,
and iii) data from a (multi)database that maintains historical sensor data. The second
and third data streams mentioned are used for corroboration of the ﬁrst data stream,
by checking for discrepancies in the values, whether in variation or in conformance
to physical (hydraulic) laws that govern the operation of the physical infrastructure
of the WDN. If no data is available from nearby sensors, as would be the case if all
nearby sensors are in sleep mode, the history multidatabase will serve as the only
source of data for corroboration.
The semantic interpretation service is incorporated in the Data Integrity Check
use case to organize the information into a meaningful hierarchy. The SSM provides
the ability to perform imprecise queries on the aforementioned data sources, by facilitating the identiﬁcation of semantically similar/dissimilar data. In concert, use of the
semantic interpretation service and the SSM while checking data integrity provides
transparent and uniform access to heterogeneous data sources. The SSM maintains a
hierarchical (logical) meta-data structure based on access terms imported from various
local databases, and can be implemented using existing multidatabase technologies,
without requiring update or reconﬁguration of the local databases. This feature is
critical in WDNs, where modifying legacy databases is often infeasible. In this fashion, local autonomy is preserved, while supporting scalability. This approach is very
well-suited to large WDNs, which are composed of multiple autonomous districts,
each of which can potentially have a diﬀerent local conﬁguration.
After the integrity of the sensor data is conﬁrmed, it is passed on to the
Decision Support Algorithm, which utilizes data from two additional sources, each of
which can exhibit signiﬁcant heterogeneity. One of these data sources is the history
multidatabase, which maintains information about past results of decision support,
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e.g., valve settings. Information transmitted from other agents serves as a second
data source. For most cases, the other agents are the neighboring agents whose
geographical locations are close to the local agent. The Decision Support Algorithm
is typically implemented in distributed fashion, and its goal is to facilitate intelligent
management of physical commodities - in this case, water. The algorithm can make
use of legitimate (corroborated) data whose integrity has been checked, and can also
resort to the history multidatabase for adjustment (rectiﬁcation) of the calculated
values in determining an appropriate strategy for resource allocation. Meanwhile, the
local agent interacts and negotiates with other agents by sharing real-time information
that provides a global perspective of resources in the system, and adjusts its own
strategy accordingly.
Construction of a state diagram is the next step in qualitative analysis of the
WDN, as it describes dynamic operation of the system. For simplicity, at this stage,
we consider only the quantity water and do not represent actions related to controlling
its quality (chemical composition). Figure 3.2 depicts the state transition diagram of
a WDN during one data processing period, which begins when the data is collected
and ends when intelligent control has been exerted on the water ﬂow. The condition
that can trigger entry to or exit from a particular state has been speciﬁed on the
corresponding arc.
In Fig. 3.1, we have highlighted the states where signiﬁcant heterogeneity is
likely to be encountered. The Data Integrity Check is the most critical state for processing data from heterogeneous sources, and for using the capabilities of the SSM to
achieve interoperability. When applying the SSM atop the semantic interpretation,
the heterogeneous data sources are reconciled by extracting the essence of the data
semantics and aggregating similar data into a more compact semantic entity for further processing. The resulting interoperability among autonomous areas in the WDN
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Figure 3.2: State transition diagram for a WDN.

presents the decision support algorithm with transparent and uniﬁed access to more
compact information.
In Fig. 3.2, the encircled “H” denotes the point where the agent process is
making a decision based on a combination of historical and current data (collected by
the sensors and checked for integrity). The collection of sensor data is disabled while
multidatabase data is being retrieved; afterward, both the newly-collected sensor data
and the retrieved multidatabase data are used by the agent in an eﬀort to improve the
eﬃcacy of the decision made. Countermeasures have been abstracted as transition
states for evaluation of the reliability of the system after remedial actions.
Repast was used for validation of the qualitative WDN model, due to its
ability to factor agents, relationships, and behaviors into separate components [44].
In Fig.3.3, Fig.3.3(a) depicts how the qualitative model is translated into component
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behavior deﬁnitions by Repast. Figure 3.3(b) depicts a very simple WDN, where six
nodes are connected in a linear topology. The size of each node reﬂects the quantity
of water at the node - initially set to 100 gallons per minute (gpm). An agent is
associated with each node. The associated behavior is “Watch for quantity change”,
which represents the negotiation underlying a change in a node’s water quantity,
which can occur in reaction to changes in the water quantity of other nodes.

(a) Flow chart of the water node agent.

(b) Node deployment.

Figure 3.3: System behavior and topology assumed for Repast validation.

As a simple example, we increased the quantity of the ﬁrst node to 300 gpm,
representing an injection of water into this node. This change should incrementally
propagate to other nodes. Figure 3.4 depicts the WDN after the increase in water
has propagated to three downstream nodes, as reﬂected by the increased size of the
nodes. Figure 3.5 illustrates the gradual propagation of this change to all six nodes
of the WDN.
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Figure 3.4: Node deployment during simulation.

Figure 3.5: Reaction to increase in water quantity of Node 1.

To reﬂect the intelligent decision-making process of the agent, we add two
decision blocks to the ﬂow chart of 3.3(a). The ﬁrst decision block evaluates whether
the current quantity is within the safe range (50-400 gpm in this example). If the
quantity is outside the safe range, then the decision ﬂow goes to the second decision
block, which prevents this unsafe change from propagating to other nodes. If the
quantity is too low, the agent will limit the change propagated, i.e., will raise the
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quantity of water at other nodes (for example to the default value of 100 gpm) to
mitigate the damage caused by the unsafe decrease. This can be accomplished by
injecting water from a conduit to the node immediately downstream. This remedial
action is shown in Fig. 3.6. Similar remedial action can be taken for a quantity that
is dangerously high, as shown in Fig. 3.7.

Figure 3.6: Isolating the unsafe decrease in water quantity of Node 1.

Figure 3.7: Isolating the unsafe increase in water quantity of Node 1.

3.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A WDN
The qualitative model described in Section 3.1 served as the basis for quantitative reliability analysis. We used the Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability
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and Performance Evaluator (SHARPE) [45] to develop and simulate a Markov chain
model for the WDN. The time-dependent functions describing each component’s behavior are restricted by SHARPE to be exponential-polynomial in form.
Figure 3.2 serves as the basis for the Markov chain model shown in Fig. 3.8,
where each state is labeled with the functionality of the system in that state, and each
transition arc is labeled with the corresponding transition probability. In the absence
of ﬁeld data, these values were estimated based on semantics of the operation of the
WDN, as deduced from hydraulics literature. Population of the model with ﬁeld data
is a future task. In Fig. 3.8, the rectangles highlight the states that represent failure
of certain components, and the circle highlights the “decision making” state, which is
the state of greatest interest from the CPS perspective. The transition probabilities
leaving each state should sum to one; however, SHARPE does not represent selftransitions, hence, the probabilities associated with self-transitions do not appear in
the ﬁgure.
We applied the severity speciﬁcation in FMEA [46], to categorize the ﬁve types
of failures marked by the rectangles in Fig. 3.8 into three groups:
1. The most critical failure is the “decision fail”, as the failure of this component
can lead to malfunction of the overall system.
2. The second-level failures are the “pipe bursts” and/or the “actuator fail”, as
both pipes and actuators have repair mechanisms and hence can recover from
the failure states.
3. The third-level failures are the “sensor fail” and/or the “check fail”. The data
integrity check is likely to identify faulty sensor data. At this point, we are
assuming that the checking mechanism is relatively reliable, as compared to
other components of the system. This assumption can be relaxed in the future.
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Figure 3.8: Markov chain model for an intelligent WDN.

The UML state transition diagram for a purely physical WDN is shown as
Fig. 3.9. Similar to its CPS counterpart - the intelligent WDN, a local node can
exchange water with its neighboring nodes, and the neighboring nodes can in turn
interact with each other. However, in a purely physical WDN, the water exchange is
not controlled by agents, and therefore no intelligent decision support or automated
failure mitigation exists.
The Markov chain model for a purely physical WDN is depicted in Fig. 3.10.
The “sensor detection” state (on the far left) represents the collection of data when
a “new water quantity” occurs. In this state, information is reported for accounting
purposes, not for decision support. The “actuator control” state (circled) is the only
state in the system where some measure of intelligence is present in managing the
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Figure 3.9: State transition diagram for a purely physical WDN.

water on the physical network. However, the actuator control is itself vulnerable to
failure, the occurrence of which may lead to the “pipe bursts” state. This state is
considered an absorbing state, as the physical system is assumed to fail if a pipe
bursts in the network. This is based on the assumption that the lack of real-time
communication prevents timely alert of this failure and considerably delays repair.
Similar to the Markov model for the CPS, the transition probabilities have been
assigned based on understanding of the semantics of the system. An extension planned
to this work is derivation of these probabilities from ﬁeld data.
The analysis editor provided by SHARPE can be used to compare various
reliability attributes, e.g., mean time to system failure (MTTSF ), of the physical and
intelligent (cyber-physical) WDNs. For the CPS, the MTTSF ranges from 86.93 to
175.08 sec, while for the purely physical WDN, it ranges from 3.94 to 4.07 sec. As
expected, the cyber infrastructure delays system failure. The expected reward (Exrt)
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Figure 3.10: Markov chain model for a purely physical WDN.

is a parameter that can reﬂect the relative intelligence level of the two systems. For
the CPS, the Exrt at t = 100 sec is 8.66, as compared to 5.22 for the purely physical
WDN.

3.3 A SEMANTIC AGENT FRAMEWORK FOR MODELING WDNs
The multi-agent model described in Section 3.1 was extended to incorporate
semantic agents, which represent dynamic integration of information from the sensor
networks with semantic services to facilitate real-time decision support in the WDN.
The resulting semantic agent framework is described below.
3.3.1 Sensor Information Ontology.

Semantic interpretation is carried

out on semantic streams of veriﬁed data, each of which is deﬁned in a domain-speciﬁc
ontology associated with the agent. Generally, an ontology is a description, e.g.,
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a formal speciﬁcation of the relationships among a number of entities. The notion
of ontology utilized in this dissertation is a model that describes semantic relations
among components of the physical and cyber infrastructures, respectively, as well as
interdependencies across the cyber-physical boundary.
Each component in the ontology model is a unique class in terms of implementation, with properties and parameters described in the class deﬁnition. The
relations deﬁne how classes can be related to one another. Semantic interpretation
is implemented through distributed software with capabilities of extraction, analysis,
and processing of the semantic stream. The deﬁnition of an ontology for the WDN
domain facilitates the extraction of useful information from the heterogenous data,
uniﬁes information presentation, and permits software and information reuse, so as
to reduce information redundancy during the process of semantic interpretation by
the agents.
Figure 3.11 shows the information hierarchy for failure detection through the
semantic interpretation process, given the veriﬁed sensor data. In this ﬁgure, which is
a UML class diagram, each block (class) represents one type of semantic stream in the
WDN; i.e., the ontology captures the semantic relationships among the heterogeneous
data streams.
Figure 3.11 shows how a failure in the WDN can be detected by the agent
in the event of physical or cyber failure, the latter of which occurs when data falls
outside a pre-deﬁned safety range. Failures in the physical infrastructure of a WDN
are of two main types: physical failure due to excessive values of pressure and elevation, or biochemical failure due to excessive quantities of a biochemical substance
or discovery of unknown biochemical materials. Failures in the cyber infrastructure
can be attributed to either human error (accidental or malicious), or malfunction of
computing devices. The ultimate determination of failure is carried out by the agent,
which has authority over all sensors deployed within its administrative scope.
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Figure 3.11: Failure detection ontology for a WDN.

The sensor information ontology captures the semantics of entities (classes in
the UML diagram) and the relations of events and objects, resulting in intelligent
reasoning capability beyond what sensors can provide through detection alone. The
ontology proposed in Fig. 3.11 is speciﬁc to the WDN domain, but can be readily
adapted to other CPSs.
3.3.2 Model for Semantic Services.

Based on the sensor information

ontology proposed, we can develop components for implementing conversion of semantics between classes in the information processing hierarchy. This conversion is
carried out by extracting new semantic information from existing data streams. In
other words, the components encapsulate the semantic service into a “black-box”
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containing the execution method, which takes as input information corresponding
to events detected by sensors and generates as output a number of meaningful new
events.
A semantic service model is proposed to overlay the ontology deﬁned in Fig. 3.11.
The semantic services can be categorized into two types: i) supplementation services,
which supplement input events with additional semantic annotation; and ii) transformation services, which produce new semantic streams. Supplementation services
can only identify additional properties carried by the input event. For example, a
sensor has detected that the water pressure in a certain area has exceeded the safety
threshold and reports this event to its semantic service component, which can be a
sensor or multiplexer at a higher level of the information hierarchy. The semantic
service model associated with this component will add the geographical location as
an additional identiﬁer to distinguish this event from events reported from other areas. Such functionality is particularly useful for distributed control and management
in the context of CPSs, where a service may not correspond to a centralized component that physically exists on one device; it can be physically implemented on several
distributed devices, but logically exist as a single service.
In contrast, a transformation service automatically terminates the input semantic stream, and generates an output semantic stream for propagation on the
ontology. The essence of this type of service is semantic transformation, where the
input and output events are diﬀerent classes in the ontology. One typical semantic
transformation is generalization. For example, in Fig. 3.11, an excessive pressure
quantity will be interpreted as physical failure due to an abnormal pressure value.
Later on, the semantic stream of physical failure will be propagated to a higher level
for ultimate decision making, instead of the semantic stream of abnormal pressure
quantity, which no longer exists. Transformation services can greatly reduce the
complexity of the data stream, by extracting only unique and necessary information.
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Therefore, transformation is the main semantic service that reconciles heterogeneity,
by transparently unifying semantically similar streams.
The beneﬁts of this semantic service model and information ontology include
the reduction of information redundancy, pre-processing and abstraction of data for
the agent, and the facilitation of semantic queries. A cyber component can issue a
query that requests that a certain data stream with desired semantics be provided to
a given component device to diagnose whether failure exists at the queried level. The
SSM further enhances this ability, processing the query based on semantic similarity
to other queries, thereby enabling support of imprecise queries. Greater detail on this
feature is presented in Section 3.4.
3.3.3 Semantic Agent Framework.

Figure 3.12 illustrates how the

agents use the information collected by sensors and the interpreted semantics based
on the deﬁned ontology. Raw data is obtained from sensor networks, and since each
agent is an independent entity in charge of a particular geographical region, sensors
located in distributed areas are managed by diﬀerent agents (with possible overlap).
For a semantic service component, the input semantic events are preconditions of the
service. The postconditions, i.e., the processed output semantics are provided to the
agents for further computing.
To implement the service in C++, the properties of the service are parameterized, and the execution method of the service becomes the corresponding method of
the service class. For example, consider the Pressure to Failure branch of Fig. 3.11.
Sensors are treated as services with only output semantics, which are parameterized
into data that can be used by superior service components (those at a higher level of
the information hierarchy). Each component has been speciﬁed with a service name
and associated parameters. Each service takes the output of an inferior component
as the input to its execution method, and inherits the parameters to ensure that attributes of a potential failure source (such as pressure, failure time, or location) are
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Figure 3.12: Semantic agent framework.

not lost during information propagation on the ontology. Pseudocode for our C++
implementation is shown in Fig. 3.13.

3.4 RECONCILING DATABASE HETEROGENEITY
In developing a multi-agent model for a CPS, our focus in this subsection is on
reconciling heterogeneity among the data sources underpinning the intelligent decision
support. We utilize SSM to establish semantic interoperability among heterogeneous
data sources, while maintaining high performance and local autonomy.
3.4.1 Model Structure.

The SSM is an advanced semantic processing

model that supports our semantic services by extracting the semantics of access terms
from underlying local databases and forming a hierarchical information structure.
The SSM increases the eﬃciency of information retrieval from distributed sources by
merging similar semantics. The imprecision allowed in queries as a result of using
SSM extends beyond the syntax and linguistics, to the location of data, which is a
vital capability for critical infrastructure systems such as CPSs.
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Sensor{
water_sensor, geoID,[width,length,height],
/* properties of sensors: water detection, geographical ID, location*/
Outputs(pressure, elevation, biochemical, location);
/*the parameters can be detected by sensor* /
}
Pressure component:
Pressure_Service{
service(pressure),
/*service indicates execution method and the parameter is pressure*/
Inputs (sensor(water_sensor, geoID, [width,length,height]));
If (pressure > normal range)
Outputs (pressure_normal (false), detected (pressure,geoID,T));
/*add the judgment result and time T*/
}
Physical component:
Physical_Service{
service(physical_failure),
Inputs(pressure_service(pressure_normal(false), detected (pressure,geoID,T)));
If ((elevation < normal range) && (pressure_normal = false))
/*guarantees pressure is the unique reason*/
Outputs(physical_normal(false), detected(physical_failure,pressure,geoID,T));
/*inherit inferior attribute*/
}
Water component:
Water_Service{
service(water_failure),
Inputs(physical_service(normal(false), (physical_failure,pressure,geoID,T)));
If ((biochemical_normal = true) && (physical_normal = false))
/*same as above*/
Outputs(water_normal(false), detected(water_failure,physical _failure,pressure,geoID,T));
}
Threshold component:
Threshold_Service{
service(failure),
Inputs(physical_service(normal(false), detected(physical_failure,pressure,geoID,T)));
Switch(detected(pressure))
{
Case (within range for safe): service terminates;
Case (within range for critical): send (pressure,geoID,T) to database;
Case (within range for safe): output system failure alert;
Default: service terminates;
}
Outputs(system_failure_alert, detected( water_failure,physical _failure,pressure,geoID,T));
}

Figure 3.13: Pseudocode for semantic service.

By maintaining a hierarchical meta-data structure based on the information
retrieved from the underlying local databases, the model can intelligently resolve
terminology diﬀerences using predeﬁned word relationships from a standard thesaurus
or dictionary. The Cambridge Scientiﬁc Abstracts Engineering Thesaurus [47] is
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one such reference for the WDN domain. It deﬁnes a set of standard hydraulic
access terminologies, the semantic categories to which they belong, and the semantic
relationships among them.
A sample SSM for a WDN is shown in Fig. 3.14, which for brevity presents
only a few of the numerous potential summary schemas that could potentially exist.
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Figure 3.14: Summary Schema Model for WDN access terms.

At the bottom of the ﬁgure are the local databases (one for each autonomous
water district) that represent the sensor data, or databases with physical conﬁguration
or historical information. The local schema associated with each local database is a list
of access terms, e.g., pump, reservoir, for the data within. Based on the deﬁnitions in
the engineering thesaurus, the summary schema can be formed by mapping the access
terms of lower-level nodes to their hypernyms and resolving semantic similarities
among these hypernyms. In linguistics, a hyponym is a word or phrase whose semantic
ﬁeld is included within that of another word, which is a hypernym. In computer
science, this relationship is denoted as an “is-a” relationship; i.e., the hypernym
describes a semantic relation in which one word is a speciﬁc type of another. For
instance, the fact that a “reservoir” in the context of a WDN is a type of “source”
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describes the hyponymic relationship between these two access terms. Therefore, each
summary schema node is a logical database that contains meta-data representing the
abstract and essential contents of the local schemas of its children. As a result, higher
levels of the SSM have very compact schema.
3.4.2 Semantic Distance Metric.

Fundamental to operation of the SSM

is the ability to quantify the semantic similarity of two terms. The semantic distance
metric (SDM) is deﬁned to this end [48]. A general-purpose thesaurus can be used to
calculate the SDM for pairs of terms, but is of limited use in specialized applications
such as WDNs, as it cannot capture the technical nuances implied. As mentioned
in the previous section, a specialized dictionary or thesaurus can serve as a reference
for creating a hierarchy of hyponyms with synonym cross references between subtrees
of the SSM, facilitating the calculation of the SDM. Each subtree of the SSM is
comprised of individual meaning clusters or semantically-linked words.
The SSM is essentially a taxonomy composed of i) pairs of terms and ii)
hypernym and synonym links connecting these terms. The SDM is a weighted count
of the number of links between two terms, i.e., a large number of links implies that
two terms are relatively diﬀerent in meaning. The weighting is necessary, because
diﬀerent links represent diﬀerent aspects of semantic similarity. As an example, a link
connecting synonyms has a lower weight than a hypernym/hyponym link, because
the former provides a more precise description of semantic closeness. Figure 3.15
demonstrates the calculation of the SDM for terms describing potential failures in
a WDN. Such a hierarchy could facilitate query of failure history databases. The
leaf-level terms are in the local schemas, and the upper-level terms are the summary
schemas.
If we assign a weight of 1 to all links, then the terms with SDM = 1 as imprecise
references to “pipe break” include “pipe burst,” “pipe cutoﬀ” and “pipe corrosion.”
Similarly, a term with SDM = 2 from“pipe-break” is “link failure,” and a term with
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Figure 3.15: Hierarchy of WDN failure terms.

SDM = 3 is “link down.” Beyond use of the engineering thesaurus, design of such
an SSM taxonomy can be based on knowledge of the application, experience with
and statistical analysis of previous queries, and even on the bias of the taxonomy
compiler [30], each of which can introduce subjectivity to a diﬀerent extent.
3.4.3 Imprecise Queries.

Imprecise queries allow users to specify data ref-

erences in their own terms, rather than the system’s predeﬁned terms. By using the
SDM in the summary schemas hierarchy, imprecise data references to semantically
similar system access terms can be quantitatively compared. The SSM can be conﬁgured to set the maximum SDM acceptable for a match - the higher this value, the
greater the tolerance for imprecision in the query terminology. In multidisciplinary
applications such as CPSs, it is prudent to allow for greater values of SDM, as the
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system design and implementation is carried out by practitioners from a diverse array
of backgrounds - each of which uses speciﬁc and possibly diﬀerent terminology.
In the case of a WDN, queries can take place at any layer of the sensor information hierarchy deﬁned on the ontology. Imprecise-query support eliminates the
need for knowledge of the location of or local access terms (the leaf nodes in Fig. 3.14)
for the data. Imprecise queries are denoted as such by the entity making them. When
this notation is identiﬁed, the summary schemas structure matches the reference to
the semantically closest precise reference, based on the SDM. From this point onward,
the imprecise query is processed as if it were a precise query.
More speciﬁcally, the SSM processes imprecise queries in a fashion similar
to that of precise queries, i.e., parsing the query, sending data access requests to
remote data sources, and combining the data accessed according to the operations
speciﬁed in the query. However, for imprecise queries, a reference resolution phase is
added between parsing the query and sending the remote access requests [30]. The
resolution involves a search that begins at the origin node of the query, and searches
upwards in the SSM hierarchy until a node is encountered that has a potential match
in its summary schema. The search continues downwards in the subtree rooted at the
potential match node. If an access term is found that is within the maximum SDM,
it is considered a match.
As a simple example of imprecise-query processing, Fig. 3.16 depicts the procedure for querying a multidatabase platform (which can include both history and
sensor databases) for information about WDN failure. The query issued may specify “link down” as the type of failure sought. The local access term, which is the
name used to describe the data in the local database, may be “pipe burst,” which is
more typically used in hydraulics. This diﬀerence in terminology can be resolved if
a maximum SDM of 3 or greater is speciﬁed. This enables the use of heterogeneous
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databases and sensor networks, without compromising the decision support carried
out by the cyber infrastructure.

Parse:

Resolve:

Continue:

Execute:

parse query at origin node;
if all data references are precise then
go to Execute;
else
send query to immediately higher node in SSM hierarchy;
end
foreach imprecise data reference do
calculate SDM for imprecise data reference and local summary schema;
if any local term is within max SDM of the imprecise data reference then
search subtree rooted at this node for access term that is within max SDM;
if such a term is found then
replace imprecise data reference with precise term;
else
reference is still considered imprecise;
end
end
end
if all data references in query are precise then
go to Execute;
else
else if root of SSM hierarchy has been reached then
reject query - nothing found within max SDM;
end
send query to immediately higher node;
go to Resolve;
end
execute query using standard multidatabase facilities;

Figure 3.16: Imprecise query processing algorithm for fault detection in a WDN.

As depicted in Fig. 3.2, the data retrieved as the result of the query is sent
to the agent for use in the decision support algorithm that will determine settings
for physical control devices such as valves. Computational techniques such as game
theory can be used to ensure that the settings are conﬁgured to prevent future recurrence of the failure [15]. The agent can also trigger a sequence of actions that
lead to repair of the pipe, or can reroute water to avoid exceeding the capacity of
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downstream pipes. Our investigation of real-time feedback-based control carried out
by the cyber infrastructure of a WDN is reported in [9].

3.5 INTEGRATED CYBER-PHYSICAL SIMULATION OF A WDN
Simulation was fundamental to understanding the operation of the WDN, and
facilitated the development of the qualitative models. However, a simulator capable of
representing both the cyber and the physical infrastructures of the WDN could not be
identiﬁed. We proceeded to develop an integrated cyber-physical simulator for WDNs,
using EPANET 2.0 [8] and MATLAB to represent the physical infrastructure and
the decision support algorithms used to control the allocation of water, respectively.
EPANET can capture the layout of a WDN and track the water ﬂow, pressure, depth
of water in tanks, and the concentration of given chemical substances. A simple model
created by EPANET is shown in Fig. 3.17, which includes all the necessary elements
of a physical WDN. The reservoir is the major component that provides water to
consumers that include tanks and junctions. The actuators are pumps (which control
the water pressure) and valves (which turn the water ﬂow on or oﬀ). The legend of
Fig. 3.17 denotes the water level within the nodes or pipes.

Figure 3.17: A simple topology in EPANET.
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In the WDN depicted in Fig. 3.17, the reservoir is providing water to the tank
and a number of diﬀerent junctions. The reservoir in this ﬁgure always contributes
water to the network, so its demand value is negative - in this case 9884.69 gpm. The
tank consumes the highest amount of water. Each junction is also labeled with its
demand value, and each pipe with its ﬂow speed. The entire graph is color-coded
to simplify the categorization of demand or ﬂow. The demand values of pumps and
valves vary in accordance with the nodes they control.
MATLAB has powerful computational capability and can support advanced
techniques, i.e., distributed decision support algorithms, for managing the water resources. The procedure for simulation of a WDN with EPANET and MATLAB is
depicted in Fig. 3.18, and can be generalized to other CPS domains.

Matlab (simulator for cyber infrastructure)
2. Parse report
to extract input
for algorithms

Specify initial
WDN
configuration

1. Run
EPANET and
generate full
report

3. Run decision
support algorithms
to determine
controller settings

4. Output these
settings as a
.INP file

5. Provide this .INP
file to EPANET as
initial configuration

EPANET (simulator for physical infrastructure)

Figure 3.18: Procedure for simulation of a WDN.
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4

ONTOLOGIES AND DECISION SUPPORT

In this section, we propose and validate a decision support system for WDNs
that makes use of cyber infrastructure for automated reasoning. The agent-based
paradigm introduced in Section 3 is extended to enable the use of ontologies in classiﬁcation of failure events and identiﬁcation of appropriate countermeasures. The
work presented in this section has been submitted to the Proceedings of the 45th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, and is under review as of Aug.
2011. Extensions to this work planned for the immediate future include generalization of the ontologies to other ﬂow transport CPSs, including smart grids and ground
transportation networks.
The premise underlying the automated failure mitigation proposed in this
dissertation is that a database is available that associates a set of countermeasures
with a set of failure types. As an aside, we investigated data retrieval from such a
database, with the goal of determining the most eﬃcacious search techniques. The
results of our investigation are presented in Appendix D and have been omitted from
this section in the interest of coherence.

4.1 FUNCTIONAL MODEL
The very ﬁrst step in constructing a CPS ontology model is to identify the
major functional components of the system. Figure 4.1 depicts the six main functional components of a CPS used for transporting a physical commodity. WDNs,
smart grids, and intelligent transportation systems can be abstracted in this fashion,
as they transport water, electric power, and vehicles; respectively. In such transport
systems, both discrete and continuous ﬂows (the values of which can be quantized)
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are carried by passive entities, and controlled, commanded and monitored by actuated components. The cyber components (where the agents reside) control both the
actuators (directly) and passive entities (indirectly), and provide intelligent decision
support for eﬃcient management of the transport system. Figure 4.2 depicts the
instantiation of the functional model of Fig. 4.1 for a WDN.

Figure 4.1: Functional model of a CPS for commodity transport.

4.2 COMPONENTS IN WDN ONTOLOGY FRAMEWORK
On the basis of the use case diagram of Fig. 3.1 and the functional components
of Fig. 4.2, we present the building blocks of the ontology framework - the classes.
We use Protégé 4 [49] as the platform for creation of the WDN ontology.
4.2.1 WDN Ontology Class.

The topmost classes of the WDN are shown

in Fig. 4.3, according to the functionalities identiﬁed in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 3.1. The

39

Figure 4.2: Functional model of WDN.

class Thing is the set containing all the subclasses, under which all other classes are
deﬁned.

Figure 4.3: Topmost classes of WDN.
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Classes can be organized into a superclass-subclass hierarchy, which is quite
similar to a taxonomy. We adopt OWL-DL [50] in Protégé to deﬁne the superclasssubclass relationships, which can be automatically computed by a reasoner and visualized in diagrams. An automated reasoner can process and parse OWL-DL to understand the relationships among deﬁned classes - speciﬁcally determining whether a
particular class is a subclass of another. The classes that we have deﬁned in OWL-DL
for the WDN are presented in Figs. 4.4 to Fig. 4.9, where the superclass-subclass
relationships are clearly depicted.
The failure type class is created based on FMEA [46] and fault tree analysis
[51]. The Computer-System-Vulnerability class is adopted from an existing ontology
developed by the Resilience for Survivability group [52]. The mitigation technique
database is designed to address a broad range of failures, and makes reference to [53].
4.2.2 Automated Reasoning Based on Classes.

An automated reasoner

can utilize the OWL-DL model to compute the inferred ontology class hierarchy, as
depicted in Fig. 4.10. The graph has been generated using OWLViz, a visualization
plug-in for Protégé. The blue rectangle denotes the selection made when we query the
“Decision MakingFail Mitigation” class. The hierarchical ontology in OWL-DL facilitates identiﬁcation of the superclass and subclasses of “Decision MakingFail Mitigation.”
The arcs representing “is-a” relationships have been denoted as such in Fig. 4.10.
As an example, a “PipeOverload” can be automatically identiﬁed as a type
of pipe failure. Once the failure type has been identiﬁed, the associated mitigation
technique can be determined, and countermeasures can be actuated for the physical
components. Identiﬁcation of the appropriate mitigation technique takes place in
a top-down fashion, with higher-level classes being investigated before lower-level
classes [11].
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Figure 4.4: Ontologies for actuator class.

4.3 AUTOMATED FAILURE CLASSIFICATION AND MITIGATION
In OWL, properties describe relationships between classes or individuals instances of the class and the subclass can also be viewed as individuals of the superclass. The two main types of properties in OWL-DL are “object” and “datatype.”
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Figure 4.5: Ontologies for passive entity, sensor network, and water network classes.

We illustrate the use of these properties in automatic classiﬁcation and mitigation of
failure.
4.3.1 Object Properties for Behavior Reasoning. The object properties
specify relationships between two classes or individuals. By OWL-DL convention,
the properties are preﬁxed with the word “has” or “is” to clarify the meaning of the
property for humans; to take advantage of the “English Prose Tooltip Generator”,
which uses this naming convention where possible to generate more human-readable
class descriptions [49]; and to facilitate automated reasoning.
The properties we have deﬁned for the WDN ontology are shown in Fig. 4.12.

43

Figure 4.6: Continuous ﬂow class.

We can further deﬁne characteristics for each object property to enrich its
meaning or to constrain its domain or range. More speciﬁcally, a property can be
characterized as one of the following [49]:
1. Functional: A functional property relates a given individual to at most one
other individual, e.g., “computer has command over actuator”, speciﬁes that the
computer can send commands to the actuator, as opposed to directly exerting
control over the ﬂow transported by the CPS.
2. Inverse functional: Properties that measure the inverse properties are functional. For example, if we deﬁned an “isCommandedBy” property, then it is
the inverse functional property of “actuator is commanded by computer.”
3. Transitive: If a property relates individual a to individual b, and also individual
b to individual c, then we can infer that individual a is related to individual c via
the same property. For instance, an actuator can be controlled by a computer,
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Figure 4.7: Subclasses of cyber entity class.

and a pipe (passive entity) can in turn be controlled by the actuator, therefore,
the “isControlledBy” property can be characterized as transitive.
4. Symmetric: When individual a is related to individual b via property P, and
vice versa; P is characterized as symmetric.
5. Asymmetric: Any property that is not symmetric is characterized as asymmetric. Most of the properties in our WDN ontology are asymmetric.
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Figure 4.8: Failure type class.

6. Reﬂexive: A property that relates an individual to itself is characterized as
reﬂexive. For instance, in our ontology, the “MitigationTechniqueDatabase” is
reﬂexively related to “hasMitigationIdentiﬁcation.”
7. Irreﬂexive: Individuals related by an irreﬂexive property cannot be the same.
The object properties can be further characterized with a domain and a range,
respectively. The object properties link classes (individuals) from the domain to
classes (individuals) from the range. In the relationship “computer has command
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Figure 4.9: Mitigation technique class.

over actuator”, the “computer” is the domain and the “actuator” is the range. The
domain and the range in OWL-DL are used as “axioms” in reasoning. It is worth
noting that an axiom is one of the main components of an ontology; others include
concepts, individuals and relationships. Figure 4.13 shows the characteristics and the
description of the domain and range of property “hasCommandOver”.
Figure 4.14 depicts an overarching map of the object properties that interconnect various classes and subclasses in the WDN ontology. The map is automatically
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Figure 4.10: Deduced superclass and subclasses of “Decision MakingFail Mitigation.”

Figure 4.11: Failure type identiﬁcation.

generated based on the “axioms” used in reasoning. Not all properties have been
reﬂected in this map; it is intended to demonstrate how object properties can be
used to infer relationships among diﬀerent classes. Two types of arcs appear in
Fig. 4.14 - solid and dashed. A solid arc represents a “superclass-subclass” relationship, such as “software” and “algorithm.” A dashed arc represents an object
property, e.g., if the arrow on the arc between “Software” and “Continuous Flow”
is activated, then the object property is highlighted as “Software” hasAdvancedComputation of the “Continuous Flow”. Similarly, “WaterNetwork” hasFlow of the
“ContinuousFlow”; “SensorNetwork” hasMonitorOf the “ContinuousFlow”; “CyberEntity” hasIntegrityDataOf “DataIntegrityCheck”; “Computer” hasCommandOver
“Actuator”; “MitigationTechniqueDatabase” hasSuggestionToComputation for “DecisionMakingSystem”; and the “Computer” can send three diﬀerent types of control
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Figure 4.12: Top object properties.

Figure 4.13: Characteristics and description of an object property.

commands to the valve and the pump (subclasses of the actuator), including “hasIncreaseOriginalValue”, “hasDecreaseOriginalValue” and “hasMaintainOriginalValue”.
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Figure 4.14: Map of object properties in WDN ontology.

Figure 4.15 depicts the interaction of the major components of the cyber entity
class. In this example, once a failure is identiﬁed as being of the type “PipeOverload”,
appropriate countermeasures can be automatically identiﬁed and retrieved from the
mitigation techniques database. This is reﬂected by the connection between the
“hasMitigationIndentiﬁcation” property and the failure type database. The mitigation technique database has the reﬂexive property “hasMitigationIdentiﬁcation”
to facilitate identiﬁcation of appropriate countermeasures. If a failure is identiﬁed
as being of type “PipeBurst”, the corresponding mitigation technique is determined
to be “Repair PipeBurst”. This class will mitigate the pipe burst failure through
the object property “hasPipeRepaired”. In the meantime, the mitigation technique
database will trigger decision support by “hasSuggestionTo Computation”, which
leads to computation of updated values for the actuator command.
4.3.2 Data Properties for Value Reasoning.

Data properties link an

individual to an XML schema datatype value, i.e., they describe the type of relationship between an individual and data values. For instance, we can use data properties
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Figure 4.15: Classes and object properties relevant to failure mitigation.

to describe the pressure value of the water ﬂow, specify respective numeric ranges for
“high” and “low” ﬂow pressure in a particular water consumption area, and determine whether the water allocated is suﬃcient. This judgment capability can be used
to improve the dependability of the WDN. For example, we can conﬁgure a threshold
value for the ﬂow pressure, and once this threshold is exceeded (reﬂecting potential
failure), a mitigation technique can be identiﬁed and initiated.
We use “pressure” as an example to demonstrate automated reasoning for
values. Initially, we deﬁne a data property as “has-ﬂow-pressure-value”, shown as
Fig. 4.16. We then create four instances within the “Pressure” class and deﬁne the
properties of each instance.
Figure 4.17 shows the data property deﬁnition for “Commercial-Area-WaterPressure”, which is “has-ﬂow-pressure-value 400”. This speciﬁes that the average
water pressure in a commercial area is approximately 400 pounds per square inch
(psi). Similarly, the average pressure values in industrial, residential, and suburban
areas are set to 700, 260 and 200 psi, respectively.
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Figure 4.16: Deﬁnition of data property.

Figure 4.17: Data property assertion for an individual.

We further reﬁne the use of data types by adding restrictions on possible
values. We deﬁne classes that specify a range of values in which we are interested; for
instance, particularly high pressure values that may indicate a failure. For example,
in Fig. 4.18, we specify that when the ﬂow pressure is greater than 450 psi, then the
pressure is identiﬁed as a “HighWaterPressure” class. Similarly, “LowWaterPressure”
is speciﬁed as “has-ﬂow-pressure-value equal to or lower than 200”.
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Figure 4.18: Deﬁnition of “HighWaterPressure.”

By automatically reasoning based on the data properties deﬁned for each individual and the range speciﬁed for each property, the members (instances) of each
subclass can be intelligently added. In Fig. 4.19, the individual “industrial-areawater-pressure” (700) is automatically added as a member of “HighWaterPressure”
that is more than 450.

Figure 4.19: Automated classiﬁcation of an individual.

4.4 VALIDATION OF AUTOMATED FAILURE MITIGATION
In this section, we present and analyze an empirical test case used to validate the automated failure mitigation technique of Section 4. The integrated cyberphysical WDN simulator described in Section 3.5 was utilized. The sensor data was
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generated by EPANET, which is used to simulate the physical infrastructure. Identiﬁcation of the failure type is carried out using the ontology model, as is determination
of the corresponding failure mitigation technique. The automated reasoning procedure is represented by an OWL-DL script; the reasoned result is converted into a
readable .txt format that can be parsed by MATLAB, which simulates the intelligent
decision support and determines appropriate settings for physical components. These
settings are fed back to EPANET, completing the control cycle.
4.4.1 Initial Conﬁguration and Normal Operation.

The topology

assumed in EPANET for the physical infrastructure is shown in Fig. 4.20.

Figure 4.20: Topology assumed for physical infrastructure.

Based on this topology (and the laws of hydraulics), EPANET determined the
initial demand (node labels) and ﬂow (link labels) to be as depicted in Fig. 4.21.
The time span and time step of simulation are conﬁgured as 24 hours and 1
hour, respectively. Throughout the time span, it is possible to change the settings
conﬁgured for any component in the physical infrastructure, or for the system as
a whole. As an example, it is possible to set the value of “total head,” which is
the hydraulic head (sum of elevation and pressure head) of water in the reservoir
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Figure 4.21: Values of demand and ﬂow at time 0.

and a required property for simulation. Fluids possess energy and the total energy
associated with a ﬂuid per unit weight of the ﬂuid is denoted as the ﬂuid’s “head,”
which is expressed in units of height. On many occasions, energy needs to be added to
a hydraulic system to overcome elevation diﬀerences, friction losses, and other minor
losses. A pump is a device to which mechanical energy is applied and transferred to
the water as total head, therefore it can add more energy to the ﬂuid. When no error
occurs in the simulation, the status of the nodes and links in each time span can be
displayed in EPANET. From the simulation results, shown in Fig. 4.22, it can be
concluded that when the total head is conﬁgured as 100 ft, reservoir 8 (node at the
bottom of the map) is operating normally at time 0.
The status of an actuator (a pump or valve) in diﬀerent time slots can also be
observed. The pressure values at 0 and 10 hours, respectively, are as shown as node
labels in Figs. 4.23 and 4.24.
4.4.2 Failure Scenario and Automated Mitigation.

Fault injection

was carried out to validate the automated failure mitigation technique. The speciﬁc
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Figure 4.22: Status of reservoir 8 at time 0, when total head = 100 ft.

Figure 4.23: Pressure values (node labels) at time 0.

fault injected was decreasing the total head from 100 to 50 ft, which corresponds to a
failure at reservoir 8. This is because the total head is a energy parameter associated
with elevation. If the elevation of the reservoir can not sustain the updated total head
value, the excessive energy will be distributed to its neighbors. This energy release
can lead to excessive ﬂow in neighboring links of the physical infrastructure, including
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Figure 4.24: Pressure values (node labels) at 10 hours.

both pipes and pumps. EPANET reﬂects this failure by displaying a warning message
with information about overloaded links, as shown in Fig. 4.25. The complete warning
message has been omitted in the interest of brevity.

Figure 4.25: EPANET warning message.

Detection of this failure by EPANET should trigger automated failure mitigation, using the ontologies introduced earlier in this section for identiﬁcation of the
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failure type and determination of the appropriate countermeasure. As our fault injection was limited to the physical infrastructure, the countermeasures applied are
changes in physical device settings. In the overload scenario described above, the
cyber infrastructure determines settings for actuators that regulate the water ﬂow.
Identiﬁcation of the failure type is the ﬁrst step in failure mitigation, and takes
place based on the warning generated by EPANET. The information embedded in
the text ﬁle shown in Fig. 4.25 is interpreted to denote a failure caused by “exceeds
maximum ﬂow,” which corresponds to the failure type of “Exceed Total Head”- a
node failure in the failure ontology of Fig. 4.8. The reasoning procedure that leads
to this determination is shown in Fig. 4.26.

Figure 4.26: Ontology-based reasoning for failure classiﬁcation.

Once the failure type is identiﬁed, the associated countermeasure is determined
using the mitigation ontology of Fig. 4.9. A snapshot of the resulting mitigation
object is shown in Fig. 4.27.
The automated reasoning procedure (an OWL-DL script), from “failure identiﬁcation” to “mitigation technique identiﬁcation” is depicted in Fig. 4.28.
In our simulator, the selected countermeasures are recorded in an OWL-DL
text ﬁle, which can be parsed by MATLAB. For the failure scenario described, the
“Adjust TotalHead” countermeasure leads to conﬁguration of the total head at reservoir 8 to 100 ft - the value under normal operating conditions. This value is calculated
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Figure 4.27: Characteristics and description of mitigation technique.

by MATLAB, and sent to EPANET as the input ﬁle shown in Fig. 4.29. The countermeasure does not aﬀect the “Pattern” (an option relevant to time speciﬁcation),
and this value is left blank in the automatically-generated ﬁle.
Exertion of this countermeasure by EPANET, for a 24-hour simulation with
1-hour time steps (the same parameters as the normal operating case of Fig. 4.21)
led to results identical to those depicted in Fig. 4.22, verifying the eﬀectiveness of
the countermeasure in restoring normal operation.
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Figure 4.28: Automated reasoning procedure for failure mitigation.

Figure 4.29: Countermeasures provided by MATLAB to EPANET.
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5

GAME-THEORY FOR DECISION SUPPORT IN WDNS

As an illustration of the utility of the tools and techniques proposed in earlier
sections of this dissertation, this section describes an agent-based environmental decision support system that utilizes game theory to guide water allocation in a WDN.
Interacting agents can elect or decline to serve (provide water to) other agents. Rewards are associated with provision of service, to encourage cooperation by the agents.
A model is presented for this service game, and its Nash equilibrium is analyzed. The
work presented in this section was published in the Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences in January 2011 [14].

5.1 MODEL OF THE SERVICE GAME
We deﬁne service in the model as provision of water to other agents. For
simplicity, we assume that an agent can submit only one service request and can
accommodate only one service request during a time slot. An agent’s status for a
given time slot is labeled as {𝑆𝑟𝑣} if it fulﬁlls any of the requests received during the
time slot. The status of all agents and requests is disseminated throughout the system.
The cycle of service request and provision repeats indeﬁnitely, which corresponds to
an inﬁnitely repeated game, 𝐺∞ . The basic game being repeated, 𝐺, is deﬁned in
terms of the following items:
• Players: all peer agents that participate in water allocation; for tractability,
peer agents are assumed to be identical.
• Actions: each agent can decide for or against service provision, denoted as
{𝑆𝑟𝑣} and {𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛}, respectively.
• Preference of each player: represented by the expected value of a payoﬀ function
determined by the action taken. When service is received by an agent, the payoﬀ
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value of the agent denoted as utility, 𝑈 ; when the agent provides service, the
payoﬀ value is denoted as cost, 𝐶.
The reputation of a player, 𝑖, in a given time slot, 𝑡, is denoted by 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑖), and
depends on whether or not it provides service, both in the current time period and
in prior periods, as represented by Equation 5.1:

𝑅(𝑡, 𝑖) = 𝑅(𝑡 − 1, 𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝑎) + (𝑤 ∗ 𝑎), 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1, 𝑡 ≥ 2

(5.1)

If service is provided by player 𝑖 in time period 𝑡, 𝑤 is set to 1, otherwise 0. The
reputation of all players is initialized as 0 at time 𝑡 = 0, and is deﬁned as 𝑤 at 𝑡 = 1.
Therefore, 0 ≤ 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑖) ≤ 1 is always maintained. In Equation 5.1, parameter 𝑎 is a
constant that captures the strength of the “memory of the system,” i.e., the relative
importance of current vs. past behavior of an agent in determining its reputation.

5.2 NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME
In the game, each player wants to gain the maximum beneﬁt, leading to a
non-cooperative game. Nash equilibrium is reached when competition ends among
the players. This occurs when the collective set of actions taken by the players with
respect to service provision is locally optimum, i.e., no player can improve its utility
by electing a diﬀerent strategy. The two types of Nash equilibria are pure and mixed.
Pure Nash equilibrium results when every player declines to serve, leading to a trivial
scenario that is not a sustainable operational state for a WDN. The mixed Nash
equilibrium, where players elect to serve in some time periods and decline service in
others, is the focus of our investigation.
In the mixed-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium action proﬁle, each player,
𝑖, elects to serve with probability 𝑝 and declines service with probability 1 − 𝑝, with
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𝑝 > 0, meaning that either action is possible. We assume that each player can provide
service prior to requesting it.
The expected payoﬀ value of electing to serve during period t is deﬁned as:

Payoﬀ(𝑆𝑟𝑣) = 𝑝 ∗ (−𝐶 + 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑆𝑟𝑣) ∗ 𝑈 )

(5.2)

In Equation 5.2, the term (−𝐶 +𝑅(𝑡, 𝑆𝑟𝑣)∗𝑈 ) illustrates the tradeoﬀ inherent
to service provision, namely, that cost of providing service as compared to the beneﬁt
of receiving service. The term 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑆𝑟𝑣)∗𝑈 reiterates that the probability of obtaining
service in the current time period depends on a player’s reputation. This payoﬀ value
of a player not only reﬂects its current payoﬀ after providing service, but also captures
the potential to obtain service in the next period, through the inclusion of 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑆𝑟𝑣),
which can be used as a health indicator that reﬂects the capability of the player to
gain service in the near future. When service is provided, 𝑤 = 1; per Equation 5.1:

𝑅(𝑡, 𝑖) = 𝑅(𝑡 − 1, 𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝑎) + 𝑎

(5.3)

Similarly, the payoﬀ value of selecting the action {𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛} is:

Payoﬀ(𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛) = (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (𝑅(𝑡, 𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛) ∗ 𝑈 )

(5.4)

The equation reﬂects the “no contribution, no cost” case. When service is
declined, 𝑤 = 0, and per Equation 5.1:

𝑅(𝑡, 𝑖) = 𝑅(𝑡 − 1, 𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝑎)

(5.5)

In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of ﬁnite games, each player’s expected
payoﬀ should be the same for all actions. In other words, the respective payoﬀ values
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for {𝑆𝑟𝑣} and {Dcln} are equal:

Payoﬀ(𝑆𝑟𝑣) = Payoﬀ(𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛)

(5.6)

Substituting from Equations 5.2 and 5.4 yields:

𝑝 ∗ (−𝐶 + 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑆𝑟𝑣) ∗ 𝑈 ) = (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (𝑅(𝑡, 𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛) ∗ 𝑈 )

(5.7)

Incorporating the iterative deﬁnition of reputation, from Equations 5.3 and
5.5, the probability of service provision, 𝑝, is determined as:

𝑝=

𝑅(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝑈 (1 − 𝑎)
−𝐶 + 2𝑅(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝑈 (1 − 𝑎) + 𝑈 𝑎

(5.8)

5.3 C++ IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the agent-based game-theoretic decision support system in
C++. The class diagram of the prototype is depicted in Fig. 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Class diagram of C++ implementation of agent-based decision support.
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The software code for Agent 1, as an example, is shown in Fig. 5.2.

Agent 1:
Attributes 1:
{
string actions ({serve}, {decline});
int time interval t = 0;
int utility value U;
int cost value C;
double reputation of the node R;
double parameter a = 0.2;
double payoff{serve};
double payoff{decline};
}

//U
//C
//R
//a

can be initialized as 800
can be initialized as 10
is constrained to (0,1)
is constrained to (0,1)

Methods1:
{
(for t = 1; t<=10; t++;)
Receive request from agent 2 ({serve2} =1); //store the {serve} request from
Receive request from agent 3 ({serve3} =1); //different agents for further service provision
Provide service to agent 2 ();
Provide service to agent 3 ();
Increment own reputation (double R)
{
R (t) = R(t-1)*(1-a)+w*a;
//store the current reputation value for further computing
};
Calculate service probability p for next time interval (double p)
{
p = (R*(t-1)*U*(1-a))/(-C+2*R*(t-1)*U*(1-a)+U*a)
};
Calculate payoff value (double payoff)
{
if {serve} = 1 then
// case that agent 1 serves other agents
payoff {serve} = p*(-C+R(t)*U);
return (payoff{serve});
else then
// case that agent 1 declines to serve
payoff{decline} = (1-p)*(R(t)*U);
return (payoff{decline});
}
}

Figure 5.2: C++ code for Agent 1.

5.4 VALIDATION OF AGENT OPERATION
Experimental validation of the game-theoretic approach to water allocation
was carried out through MATLAB simulation of the three interacting peer agents
shown in Fig. 5.3. In this section, we are validating the operation of the cyber
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infrastructure (agents) only. Cyber-physical validation using our integrated simulator
is presented in Section 5.5.

Figure 5.3: Interaction among three peer agents.

The agents are labeled Node 𝑖, Node 𝑗, and Node 𝑘, respectively. For each
agent, the service strategy is as shown in Table 5.1. The strategy shown in Table 5.1
does not exhaustively capture all actions that could be taken by the three agents, but
it provides a representative set of actions over a non-trivial duration of ten time slots.

Table 5.1: Strategy for service game.
Time 𝑡 Node 𝑖
1
Serve 𝑗
2
Decline
3
Serve 𝑘
4
Decline
5
Serve 𝑘
6
Serve 𝑗
7
Serve 𝑗
8
Decline
9
Decline
10
Serve 𝑘

Node 𝑗
Serve 𝑘
Serve 𝑖
Decline
Decline
Decline
Decline
Serve 𝑖
Decline
Decline
Serve 𝑖

Node 𝑘
Decline
Decline
Decline
Serve 𝑖
Serve 𝑖
Serve 𝑖
Decline
Decline
Serve 𝑗
Decline
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According to Table 5.1, we can summarize the strategy of each player, 𝑖, as
𝑊𝑖 below:
• 𝑊𝑖 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1]
• 𝑊𝑗 = [1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
• 𝑊𝑘 = [0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0]
5.4.1 Agent Reputation over Time.

Firstly, based on the service

strategy, we investigate how an agent’s reputation varies in the 10 time slots by
following the equilibrium strategy described in Section 5.2. Figure 5.4 depicts the
changes in 𝑅(𝑡) for each of the three agents.

Figure 5.4: Change in agent reputation over time.

According to the strategies 𝑊𝑖 , 𝑊𝑗 , and 𝑊𝑘 , respectively, the results show
that the reputation value increases when the service is provided by a particular agent
and decreases when the agent provides no service at all (or accepts service from its
peers). The equilibrium strategy maintains stability - over the 10 time intervals, the
three peer agents’ action, i.e., providing service or accepting service, will be similar
to each other. No one agent can be constantly acquiring or contributing service.
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5.4.2 Probability of Service Provision over Time.

Secondly, we in-

vestigate how the probability of service provision varies over time. Simulation results
are shown in Fig. 5.5.

Figure 5.5: Probability of service provision.

According to Equation 5.8, 𝑝 varies in each time interval depending on the
agent’s reputation at the end of the previous time interval. As 𝑈 , 𝐶 and 𝑎 remain
constant in this scenario, the agent’s reputation at the end of the previous time
interval is determined by its strategy, 𝑊 . If during the previous time interval, the
agent provided service, then in the next time interval, the probability of service
provision by the agent increases. If the agent did not provide service in the previous
time interval, then the probability of providing service decreases.
Another observation is that if an agent continuously provides service to its
peers, then the increase in probability of service provision within each interval, compared with the previous interval, will actually decrease (indicated as the circle in the
ﬁgure for player 𝑘). This again demonstrates the role of the equilibrium strategy
in the resource allocation (service provision or acquisition), i.e., to restrain an agent
that is constantly providing or constantly obtaining service.
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5.4.3 Steady-State Behavior.

An interesting question is whether steady-

state behavior of the water allocation game will settle on the service provision probability, 𝑝, of 0.5. Figures 5.6 through 5.11 provide valuable insight.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the case for player 𝑖, where 𝑈/𝐶 = 80, 𝑎 = 0.2, and the
strategy for 100 time slots consists of repeating [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1] [1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1] [0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0]. The maximum value reached by 𝑝 is 0.45.
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Figure 5.6: Probability of service provision, diverse strategy.

Keeping 𝑈/𝐶 = 80, 𝑎 = 0.2, but changing the strategy of agent 𝑖 to 100 time
slots of repeating [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1], the simulation result is as depicted in Fig. 5.7.
Similar to the case above, 𝑝 barely reaches 0.45.
In the third test case, we still have 𝑈/𝐶 = 80 and 𝑎 = 0.2, but the strategy
of agent 𝑖 remains a constant 1 over 80% of the simulation time, which means that
agent 𝑖 is serving most of the time. The simulation result shown in Fig. 5.8 illustrates
that 𝑝 still does not reach 0.5.
In yet another experiment, we maintained 𝑈/𝐶 = 80, but changed 𝑎 to 0.01,
corresponding to a system with a good memory (past actions of a player have strong
bearing over its reputation). With near-continuous service provision, the simulation
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Figure 5.7: Probability of service provision, monotonous strategy.
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Figure 5.8: Probability of service provision, near-continual service.

results were as depicted in Fig. 5.9, where unlike the aforementioned cases, 𝑝 reaches
0.5. Considering the factors that can aﬀect 𝑝 in equation 5.8, we investigated the
situation where the 𝑈/𝐶 ratio is changed to 8 and 𝑎 remains the same, the simulation
result in Fig. 5.10 shows that 𝑝 can reach 0.5.
Finally, we investigate the case that the agent is initially requesting service,
i.e., 𝑊 is 1 for the ﬁrst third of the simulation time. The simulation results are
depicted in Fig. 5.11. Simulation results show that regardless of variations in 𝑈/𝐶
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Figure 5.9: Probability of service provision, near-continual service, strong memory,
and 𝑈/𝐶 = 8.
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Figure 5.10: Probability of service provision, near-continual service, strong memory,
and 𝑈/𝐶 = 80.

and service strategy, when time goes to inﬁnity, the value of 𝑝 is mainly determined
by the constant 𝑎, which reﬂects the importance of serving during the current period.
5.4.4 Reputation vs. Service Behavior.

In addition to the probability

of service provision, 𝑝, we also investigate how the agent reputation, 𝑅(𝑡), changes
with variations in the strategy, 𝑊 . Simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.12, which
illustrates that the collaborative decision making strategy discourages continual provision of service by an agent.
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Figure 5.11: Probability of service provision, initial continual service request.
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Figure 5.12: Reputation of agent with near-continual service.

5.4.5 Reputation vs. Memory.

For additional insight into the eﬀect of

various parameters on the system operation, we vary 𝑎 to be 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8,
respectively to see how the reputation changes as 𝑎 changes. Figure 5.13 shows the
variations in the reputation of agent 𝑖 for diﬀerent values of 𝑎. The same strategy,
𝑊 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1], is used for the four groups of data.
As seen in Fig. 5.13, a larger 𝑎 will cause a more drastic change in the reputation during each time interval. This is because the constant 𝑎 plays a major role in
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Figure 5.13: Eﬀect of 𝑎 on agent reputation.

terms of deciding the importance of service provision in determining the reputation,
𝑅(𝑡, 𝑖), of an agent (see Equation 5.1).
5.4.6 Accumulated Payoﬀ vs. Service Behavior.

The simulation

results depicted in Figs. 5.14 to 5.17 show that the accumulated payoﬀ values for
{𝑆𝑟𝑣} and {𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛}, respectively, are quite close, regardless of changes in 𝑎. The service
ratio, deﬁned as ratio of the accumulated payoﬀ value for {𝑆𝑟𝑣} to the accumulated
payoﬀ value for {𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛}, is 1.07, 0.95, 0.84 and 0.74, respectively, for 𝑎 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,
and 0.8.

Figure 5.14: Payoﬀ value, 𝑎 = 0.2.

As depicted in Fig. 5.18, the variation in service ratio decreases as 𝑎 increases.
As seen in Equation 5.1, as 𝑎 increases, an agent’s reputation in the previous
time interval plays a less important role in determining the agent’s current reputation,
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Figure 5.15: Payoﬀ value, 𝑎 = 0.4.

Figure 5.16: Payoﬀ value, 𝑎 = 0.6.

Figure 5.17: Payoﬀ value, 𝑎 = 0.8.

i.e., the system’s memory becomes weaker. As an agent’s reputation increases only
when it provides service to its peers, an increased 𝑎 can discourage the agent from
contributing service to the system, and hence lead to a decrease in the {𝑆𝑟𝑣}/{𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛}
ratio.
5.4.7 Accumulated Payoﬀ vs. U/C .

We also investigate how the payoﬀ

value varies as 𝑈/𝐶 varies. Figures 5.19 through 5.23 illustrate the payoﬀ value for
each time period, for diﬀerent 𝑈/𝐶 ratios.
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Figure 5.18: Service ratio {𝑆𝑟𝑣}/{𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛} vs. a.
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Figure 5.19: Payoﬀ value, 𝑈/𝐶 = 1.1.

Figure 5.20: Payoﬀ value, 𝑈/𝐶 = 8.
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Figure 5.21: Payoﬀ value, 𝑈/𝐶 = 20.
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Figure 5.22: Payoﬀ value, 𝑈/𝐶 = 40.
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Figure 5.23: Payoﬀ value, 𝑈/𝐶 = 80.

The simulation results are summarized in Table. 5.2. The variation of 𝑈/𝐶
from 8 to 80 leads to very little change in the service ratio, {𝑆𝑟𝑣}/{𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑛}; however,

76

when 𝑈 and 𝐶 are nearly equal, as in they are in Fig. 5.19, the payoﬀ value, and
hence the service ratio may become negative. If 𝑈/𝐶 = 1, the payoﬀ value explodes
to ∞.

Table 5.2: Service ratio for diﬀerent 𝑈/𝐶 values.
𝑈/𝐶
1.1
8
20
40
80

Service ratio
-1.27
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89

5.4.8 Service Probability and Payoﬀ vs. U/C .

Finally, we investigate

the eﬀect of 𝑈/𝐶 on the probability of service provision and the payoﬀ. Figure 5.24
depicts the probability of service provision for values of 𝑈/𝐶 ranging from 40 to 120.
Figure 5.25 provides a more detailed view of the same simulation results.

Figure 5.24: Eﬀect of 𝑈/𝐶 on 𝑝.
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Figure 5.25: Detailed view of Figure 5.24

Dividing the numerator and denominator of Equation 5.8 by 𝐶 yields:

𝑝=

𝑅(𝑡 − 1) ∗ (𝑈/𝐶)(1 − 𝑎)
(−1 + 2𝑅(𝑡 − 1) ∗ (𝑈/𝐶)(1 − 𝑎) + (𝑈/𝐶)𝑎

(5.9)

Figure 5.25 illustrates that the lower the 𝑈/𝐶 ratio, the higher the probability
to of service provision. With a low 𝑈/𝐶 ratio, an agent will achieve a lower payoﬀ
value if it obtains service, as compared to the alternative action of providing service.
Therefore, a lower 𝑈/𝐶 ratio can encourage agents to provide service rather than
obtain or decline service. However, the impact of 𝑈/𝐶 on the probability of service
provision appears to be quite minor.
Figure 5.26 depicts the eﬀect of 𝑈/𝐶 on the payoﬀ value. As seen in the
ﬁgure, the higher the 𝑈/𝐶 ratio, the higher the payoﬀ value will be within each time
interval. According to the expected payoﬀ function for an agent in time period 𝑡, if
an agent provides service, the payoﬀ value will be negative. The strategy represented
is 𝑊 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1]. As depicted in the center of the ﬁgure, service provision
can help to increase the payoﬀ value.
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Figure 5.26: Eﬀect of 𝑈/𝐶 on payoﬀ value.

5.5 CYBER-PHYSICAL VALIDATION OF DECISION SUPPORT
In this section, we present results of using the integrated cyber-physical simulator to validate the environmental decision support system of Section 5. This is an
eﬀort to reﬂect dynamic behavior of the WDN and reveal interdependencies across
the cyber-physical boundary. The work presented in this section will appear as a
book chapter in late 2011 [16].
5.5.1 Topology for Integrated Simulation.

The topology that we utilize

for validating the game-theoretical decision support is identical to that of Fig. 4.20.
Three agents were assumed to control the WDN, as shown in Fig. 5.27; where reservoir
1, tank 2, junction 5 and 7, pump 1 are in the same group; reservoir 8, valve 2, junction
3 and 4 are in the same group; and reservoir 9, junction 6 and valve 9 are in the same
group. A single actuator controls the physical components within the scope of each
agent.
5.5.2 Initial Conﬁguration.

Simulation results of node demand and link

ﬂow, respectively; at the ﬁrst hour (with a simulation time step of one hour) are
summarized in Fig. 5.28 and Fig. 5.29.
From Fig 5.28, we can infer that at 1:00 hour, reservoir 1 is providing water
(indicated by its negative demand value) and reservoirs 8 and 9 are retrieving water
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Figure 5.27: Scope of each of three agents.

Figure 5.28: Node demand (in gpm) at 1:00 hour.

(indicated by their respective positive demand values). Similar to the (purely cyber)
validation of agent operation in Section 5.4, we use 1 and 0 to denote an agent that is
serving and declining to serve water, respectively. Accordingly, in the ﬁrst simulation
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Figure 5.29: Link ﬂow (in gpm) at 1:00 hour.

period, the collective strategy of the three agents is (1, 0, 0). In the topology of
Fig. 5.3, we assume that reservoirs 1, 8, and 9 are nodes i, j and k, respectively.
Water attributes; e.g., demand, pressure, head, and ﬂow, are controlled in
EPANET by actuators (pumps and valves). By sending a control command to the
actuator from the cyber infrastructure (implemented in MATLAB), we can conﬁgure
the operation of the node (reservoir) as “serve” or “decline”. As each of the three
actuators in Fig. 5.27 can be either open or closed, the eight combinations of Table 5.3
result.
Table 5.3 shows that two of the eight (actuator) conﬁgurations can lead to
failure. In other words, EPANET cannot continue simulation if pump 1, valve 2 and
valve 9 are either (open, open, open) or (open, closed, open), respectively. This is an
instance of failure propagation from the cyber to the physical infrastructure.
In Table 5.3, three water provision strategies are repeated: (1, 0, 0), (1, 1,
1) and (1, 0, 1). In other words, if the initial strategy is (1, 0 ,0), we conﬁgure
the subsequent strategy to be (1, 1, 1). Multiple actuator settings can be used to
achieve this strategy; for this case, we select the combination of (closed, open, open)
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Table 5.3: Result at time 0 with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of actuators.
Reservoir
Actuator
Status of
Actuator

1
Pump1
Open

8
Valve 2
Open

9
Valve 9
Open

Open

Open

Closed

Open

Closed

Open

Closed

Open

Open

Closed

Closed

Open

Closed

Open

Closed

Open

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Result at 0:00 hr
Error. Pump 1 opens but
exceeds max ﬂow at 0:00 hr.
Reservoir 1 is serving, others are not. [1,0,0].
Error. Pump 1 opens but
exceeds max ﬂow at 0:00 hr.
All three reservoirs are serving at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
All three reservoirs are serving at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
All three reservoirs are serving at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
Reservoirs 1 and 9 are serving, reservoir 8 is not [1,0,1].
All three reservoirs are serving at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].

for pump 1, valve 2 and valve 9, respectively. The remainder of the settings remain
unchanged from the initial conﬁguration. The control command ﬁle generated by
MATLAB (input .INP ﬁle to EPANET) is shown in Fig. 5.30, which reﬂects the
actuator conﬁgurations. As shown in the .INP ﬁle, the three actuators are conﬁgured
as (closed, open, open).

Figure 5.30: Actuator settings recommended to EPANET.
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5.5.3 Results and Analysis.

Figure 5.31 shows simulation results for when

the actuators are conﬁgured as (closed, open, open) - the scenario that all reservoirs
are serving. In Fig. 5.31, the serving reservoirs are represented in blue and have a
negative demand value (in gpm).

Figure 5.31: Results of applying the recommended actuator settings.

The node demand and link ﬂow at time 0, respectively; resulting from application of the recommended actuator settings are shown in Figs. 5.32 and 5.33.
We further investigate the case that three reservoirs are consistently (throughout the 10 simulation periods) providing water. Figure 5.34 depicts the demand value
of each reservoir for each simulation period.
Given the initial conﬁguration, EPANET (which reﬂects operation of the physical infrastructure) can operate successfully. At time 0, all reservoirs are providing
water, but the water quantity provided by reservoir 1 is much higher than that of
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Figure 5.32: Node demand at time 0 when all reservoirs are serving.

Figure 5.33: Link ﬂow at time 0 when all reservoirs are serving.

reservoirs 8 or 9. From 1:00 hour onwards, the water quantity provided by each of
reservoirs 8 and 9 has dramatically decreased, as the bulk of the water is provided by
reservoir 1.
Cyber-physical simulation of the decision support system demonstrates interdependencies that can lead to fault propagation between the cyber and physical infrastructures. Incorrect conﬁguration of the actuators may cause failures, as shown in
Table 5.3; due to constraints on the operation of physical components. The simulation
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Figure 5.34: Changes in demand values of reservoirs 1, 8 and 9.

results reiterate the need for caution in deploying CPSs for critical applications. Decision support algorithms have to be designed with knowledge of physical constraints,
to avoid causing failure in an otherwise operational physical system - defying the
purpose of using intelligent decision support.
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6

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to model, simulate,
and analyze the operation of a WDN, as a representative CPS. After careful study
of the literature, which articulates challenges to these tasks; we developed a qualitative multi-agent model capable of reﬂecting both cyber and physical aspects of
WDN operation, and more importantly, the interplay between the cyber and physical
infrastructures. After extending the multi-agent WDN model to represent semantic
interpretation of raw data, we enhanced the semantic model by utilizing SSM to reconcile semantic heterogeneity among the data sources - enabling support for imprecise
queries. Qualitative modeling served as a precursor to quantitative analysis of the
WDN, with focus on system reliability and using a Markov chain model.
The insights gained from modeling were employed in developing ontologies that
represent and/or classify relationships among various aspects of the WDN, with focus
on classiﬁcation of failure types and identiﬁcation of corresponding countermeasures
for failure mitigation. These ontologies underpin automated reasoning that realizes
one of the main beneﬁts of utilizing intelligent decision support for physical system
operation: increasing the robustness of the system against failure, by facilitating selfhealing measures that do not rely on human operators for mitigating the eﬀects of
failure. To validate our methods, we developed and utilized a simulator capable of
representing, with high ﬁdelity, the operation of cyber and physical components and
the interplay between them.
As an illustration of the practical utility of our techniques, we described and
validated a decision support system that used game theory as an algorithmic tool for
water allocation in a WDN. Correct operation of the decision support system, and
the resulting cyber-physical WDN was validated using simulation.
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A future extension planned for this research is to generalize the models and
methods developed in this dissertation to CPS domains other than water distribution,
in particular smart grids. This requires extensive study and analysis of the attributes
and functionalities of these CPS domains, and identiﬁcation of their commonalities
with and diﬀerences from WDNs. The context of any CPS can be decomposed into
the physical-level context, i.e., the concrete device and data level; and conceptuallevel context, i.e., the abstract decision support and algorithm level. We plan to
specify the context of a generic CPS in terms of these two levels. Generic context
speciﬁcation will facilitate the extension of our model to these domains, and is planned
as a research task. Ontologies are expected to be very helpful in achieving this goal,
which requires understanding of the semantics of each CPS domain.
Another extension is validation of the models and methods of this dissertation
with ﬁeld data. The validation carried out thus far relies on simulation alone. Field
data will also be used to reﬁne and validate our quantitative analysis. Currently, the
state transition probabilities in our Markov chain model for both intelligent and purely
physical WDNs have been estimated based on understanding of WDN operation and
study of hydraulics literature. We have identiﬁed an industry collaborator and will be
acquiring ﬁeld data that will enable more accurate estimation of these values. This
will facilitate more meaningful assessment of the eﬀect of the cyber infrastructure on
the reliability of water allocation. The penultimate goal is to develop a quantitative
model for reliability and security of CPSs, which would guide the deployment of these
systems and alleviate concerns about their dependability.

APPENDIX A
FURTHER QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A WDN
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This appendix articulates further detail of the qualitative WDN model presented in Section 3.1.
In qualitative modeling of agent-based WDNs, we utilize UML to capture
static and dynamic aspects of the system.
1. Class Diagram Based on the use cases and interconnections deﬁned in Fig. 3.1,
Fig. A.1 provides an overview of diﬀerent classes in the WDN, along with the
speciﬁed attributes and the corresponding methods for each class. Figure A.1
also depicts how the classes interrelate. Other information provided in Fig. A.1
includes the data types of the attributes and the main constraints used in the
decision making algorithm. The attributes of the water facility classes have
been chosen to be most representative of both static (elevation) and dynamic
aspects (head loss, a description of water energy) of water.

Figure A.1: Class diagram of a WDN.
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The Data Integrity Checking class takes three data streams, from Sensor, Physical System Conﬁguration and History Database, respectively. Data collected
by the sensors is aggregated by the multiplexor (representing by the small diamond) and sent for data integrity checking. The Physical System Conﬁguration
block speciﬁes the basic conﬁguration and topology physical water infrastructure. This conﬁguration data is sent to Data Integrity Checking to assist in
evaluating physical constraints, e.g., judging whether a newly requested water
value (such as quantity) will exceed the capacity of a pipe. History data can
be queried by the Data Integrity Checking for comparing abnormal real-time
data with historical values. Various types of semantic analysis are carried out
through Intelligent Semantic Inference, including the aforementioned evaluation of physical constraints and corroboration with historical data or data from
nearby nodes.
The purpose of this semantic inference is to screen out illegitimate or corrupted
data (based on the preliminary judging criteria), to ensure that only legitimate
data is sent to the decision making algorithm. The agent has varied types of
association with other classes: it receives the data after semantic processing,
stores the data in the history database or queries data from the database to
assist in decision making (bidirectional), negotiates resource allocation with
other agents, and exerts control over actuators (valves and pumps). All these
functionalities are implemented through running the advance Decision Support
Algorithm in the agent.
2. Component Diagram In Fig. A.2, the main program that implements water
allocation executes on the cyber infrastructure. The physical location of the
main program is immaterial. The main program is directly dependent on the
code speciﬁcation, which is the head ﬁle of the agent class. It includes prototype
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information for the class function. The remainder of the script is the package
body, which exhibits functionality similar to that of the main program and
executes in distributed fashion within its autonomous management scope. For
instance, if the script is written in C++, the package body is a .cpp ﬁle. An
independent database is attached to each script, meaning that the script can
only retrieve data from or store data to the database for management purposes
within its own scope. All the data sent to the script for advanced semantic
analysis or advanced computation during the phase of decision making has been
checked its integrity, as described earlier in this section.

Figure A.2: Component diagram of a WDN.

3. Activity Diagram
In Fig. A.3, which depicts the activity diagram for a WDN, three entities are
involved, including the physical networks; agent 1, acting as the main agent;
and agent 2 as the agent interacting with agent 1.
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Figure A.3: Activity diagram of a WDN.

The activity diagram reﬂects how an agent interacts with the environment, and
how the values in the associated object change after date integrity checking
and data processing. For instance, the raw data is changed into semanticallyprocessed data for control, and the requested water quantity of one agent may
aﬀect another agent’s water consumption quantity.
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4. Sequence Diagram
Figure A.4 depicts the sequence of messages exchanged among diﬀerent entities
in the WDN. The message on the line shows the method adopted by the receiver
(class deﬁned in the class diagram) upon receiving the message.

Figure A.4: Sequence diagram of a WDN.

The ﬁgure shows the sequence of data received by the data integrity checking
object and the decision support algorithm object of agent. For the former
object, it directly receives and checks the raw data from the sensors (collected
by multiplexor) and then if it needs to compare the real-time data with previous
history data, it will receive data from its local database to make sure the result
of checking is based on a reliable history record. The water consumer object
and the adjacent agent object are eliminated after they send the return message,
which means that no message from these two objects will be accepted outside
of particular periods. The decision support algorithm of the agent ﬁrst receives
checked sensor data ﬁrst, queries data from the history database, and ﬁnally
communicates with the adjacent agent. Such a sequence is from the physical
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infrastructure to the cyber infrastructure (bottom-up). After the decision has
been made, the calculated result will be sent to the community agent ﬁrst,
then a command will be sent to actuator to exert real-time control over the
physical commodity, and ﬁnally the calculated data is recorded as history data
in the database. Such a sequence is from the cyber network to the physical
infrastructure (top-down), culminating in data recording.

APPENDIX B
FURTHER QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A WDN
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This appendix elaborates on the quantitative analysis presented in Section 3.2.
We used the analysis editor provided by SHARPE to conﬁgure the scenarios
simulated for the Markov model. These scenarios are given in Table B.1. The Reward
rate REW denotes the reward, based on the contribution to the intelligence of the
system. Simulation results are presented in Table B.2.

Table B.1: Scenarios simulated for Markov model of an intelligent WDN.
Label
Down
Down
Down
Down
Down

State
State
State
State
State

(Down1)
(Down2)
(Down3)
(Down4)
(Down5)

Up State (UP1)
Up State (UP2)
Up State (UP3)

Initial Probability (INI)

Reward rate(REW)

Conﬁguration Group
decision fail
pipe bursts and actuator fail
pipe bursts
sensor fail
sensor fail and check fail
Components operational
but no actuator repair
Components operational
but no pipe repair
Components operational
but no actuator repair
or pipe repair
new quantity 0.5, sensor working 0.1
decision making: 0.05, actuator working:0.05
agent community: 0.1, pipe working: 0.2
new quantity: 5, sensor working: 2
decision making: 20, DB store: 7
actuator working: 2, sensor fail: -2
agent community: 10, decision fail: -15
actuator fail: -2, actuator repaired: 3
pipe bursts: -4, pipe working: 4
pipe repaired: 5, data check: 12
check fail: -10

The main purpose of this quantitative assessment exercise is to determine
the value of the cyber infrastructure, in terms of added reliability of the WDN, as
compared to its purely physical counterpart. The numeric results conﬁrm that the
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Table B.2: Numerical simulation results of an intelligent WDN.
Parameter

Transient Unavailability

Down Time

Meantime to system failure (MTTSF )
Expected reward at time t(Exrt)

Results
7.25e-003
1.18e-002
5.91e-003
3.47e-003
1.29e-002
3.81e+003
6.18e+003
3.11e+003
1.83e+003
6.81e+003
1.75e+002
1.75e+002
8.69e+001
8.66e+000

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Conﬁgurations
Down 1 INI at 100 sec
Down 2 INI at 100 sec
Down 3 INI at 100 sec
Down 4 INI at 100 sec
Down 5 INI at 100 sec
Down1
Down 2
Down 3
Down 4
Down 5
UP1
UP2
UP3
REW, INI at 100 sec

greater the number of failures, the higher the Transient Unavailability. For instance,
the value in Down 2 (1.18e-002) is much higher than the value in Down 3 (5.91e003). For the most critical failure, which is the “decision making fail”, the Transient
Unavailability is 7.25e-003. This value is better than the case in Down 3 (5.91e-003)
but not better than the case in Down 4 (3.47e-003). The Down Time refers to the
period of time when a system fails to perform its primary function. The results
conﬁrm that the greater the number of failure states, the longer the Down Time. The
case in Down 5 is the worst case, as both the sensor and the data integrity check have
failed. The resulting Down Time is the longest (6.81e+003 sec). The second worst
case is Down 2 (6.18e+003 sec), where “pipe bursts” and “actuator fail” occur.
The shortest MTTSF occurs when both “pipe repair” and “actuator repair”
fail, conﬁrming that these repair mechanisms can extend the life of the system (by
50% in this case). We use the expected reward rate at time t (Exrt) to measure
the reward rate of the overall system, based on the intelligence weight assigned to
each state, which is in turn based on the contribution of the state to the intelligence
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of the system. For example, “decision making” has the highest reward rate (20).
Similarly, as software failure will consider-ably aﬀect the intelligence of the system,
the reward rate of “decision fail” is high (-15). In a purely physical WDN, a local
node can exchange water with its neighboring nodes, which can in turn interact with
each other. However, this exchange is not controlled by agents, and therefore no
intelligent decision support or failure prevention measures exist.
The conﬁguration of parameters in SHARPE and the simulation results for
the purely physical WDN are shown in Table B.3 and Table B.4, respectively. Like
the intelligent WDN case, the Exrt denotes the expected reward rate at time t and
the Mean time to absorption denotes the state failure.

Table B.3: Scenarios for purely physical WDN.
Label
Initial Probability (INI 1)
Initial Probability (INI 2)

Reward rate(REW 1)

Reward rate(REW 2)

Conﬁguration Group
new water quantity: 0.5, neighbor 1:0.2
neighbor 2:0.1, actuator control:0.2
new water quantity: 0.4, neighbor 1:0.2
neighbor 2:0.1, actuator control:0.2
sensor detection:0.1
new water quantity: 5, neighbor 1:2
neighbor 2: 2, pipe bursts:-3
actuator control:10, sensor detection:7
actuator fail:-9
new water quantity: 5, neighbor 1:2
neighbor 2: 2, pipe bursts:-3
actuator control:15, sensor detection:7
actuator fail:-12

The numerical results show that the system reliability decreases dramatically
as time goes by, in both conﬁgurations, as expected of a system with no repair. As
the “actuator control” is the sole component that can exert intelligent control, it
has been assigned the highest reward rate (10 in REW 1 and 15 in REW 2 ). The
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Table B.4: Numerical simulation results of purely physical WDN.
Parameter

Reliability

Mean time to system failure (MTTSF)

Expected reward rate at time t (Exrt)

Results
7.83e-003
6.39e-006
3.28e-008
7.16e-003
5.86e-006
3.28e-008
4.07e+000
3.94e+000
4.06e+000
4.02e+000
4.48e+000
4.67e+000
5.08e+000
5.22e+000

Conﬁgurations
INI 1 at 20 sec
INI 1 at 50 sec
INI 2 at 100 sec
INI 2 at 20 sec
INI 2 at 50 sec
INI 2 at 100 sec
INI 1 pipe bursts
INI 1 sensor detection
INI 2 pipe bursts
INI 2 sensor detection
REW 1 INI 1 at 100 sec
REW 1 INI 2 at 100 sec
REW 2 INI 1 at 100 sec
REW 2 INI 2 at 100 sec

main diﬀerence between REW 1 and REW 2 is the increase of the reward rate for
“actuator control” and the decrease of reward rate for “actuator fail” in REW 2. The
result shows that the conﬁguration in REW 2 can enhance the Exrt of the system,
and if “sensor detection” takes place at the beginning of the simulation, the Exrt
further increases. This is due to the fact that a sensor is an intelligent device and can
contribute to the intelligence of the physical system; the earlier the sensor can play
this role, the more it can contribute to the Exrt.

APPENDIX C
INTEGRATED SIMULATION OF A COMPLEX WDN
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Results of integrated cyber-physical simulation of a WDN with a simple physical topology were presented in Section 3.5. Simulation of a more complex physical
infrastructure is presented in this appendix.
Figure C.1 shows a screen capture at hour 8:00 of a 24-hour simulation period
of a WDN. This ﬁgure also depicts node groupings, circled in green, that can facilitate
study of a subset of the nodes in the topology.

Figure C.1: A more complex topology and node groupings in EPANET.

After simulating the system for the speciﬁed duration, EPANET can provide
a report in graph, table, or text form. Among the various reports available, the
full report provides the most comprehensive data, including the initial and updated
values of all properties of the nodes and links within each simulation time step (one
hour by default). The water ﬂow, pressure at each node, depth of water in tanks and
reservoirs, and concentration of chemical substances can be tracked from the recorded
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data. In Fig. C.2, Figs C.2(a) and C.2(b) present snapshots of the link and node
information, respectively, of the full report.

(a) Link information from full report.

(b) Node information from full report.

Figure C.2: Component information from full report.

The full report generated as the output ﬁle of EPANET is automatically saved
as a plain-text .NET ﬁle. This information includes values required as input by
the decision support algorithms of the cyber infrastructure, which in turn determine
settings for physical control elements such as valves.
To simulate the provision of sensor readings and other information about
the physical infrastructure to the cyber control system, the full report generated
as output by EPANET needs to be provided as input to MATLAB. This necessitates
pre-processing of the ﬁle, and parsing of the data into the matrix form required by
MATLAB. A script using the textscan and cell2mat commands can be deﬁned within
MATLAB to carry out this pre-processing to generate a separate matrix from the
EPANET data for each entity (node or link) for each simulation time step recorded
in the full report, e.g., hour 1:00.
For simplicity, the simulation presented in this dissertation was focused on
node ﬂow. The controller (pump or valve) settings were determined by averaging the
node demand within a node group, which is a subset of nodes deﬁned in EPANET.
Figure C.1 shows a number of groups. The same parsing approach can be used to

102

extract additional data, e.g., water pressure or concentration of a given chemical, from
the EPANET report, as required by more sophisticated decision support algorithms.
Each node group can reﬂect an associated group of consumers, such as residential nodes in the south of a city. The only requirement is that each node group
include at least one controller (pump or valve), so controller settings determined by
the cyber infrastructure can be utilized in water allocation. The focus of the research
presented in this dissertation was integrated simulation of the CPS, and as such, a
simplistic approach was taken to water allocation, with the goal of distributing the
water as equitably as possible, subject to physical constraints on the nodes.
MATLAB generates a matrix of controller settings, which need to be provided
to EPANET, as they would be to the physical control elements in an actual WDN. A
.INP ﬁle is required, in a format identical to the original input provided to EPANET
in the ﬁrst step of the simulation, with controller values updated to reﬂect the settings determined by the decision support algorithm. A MATLAB script utilizing the
dlmwrite and fprintf commands can be used to generate a .INP ﬁle with the format
expected by EPANET.
In the ﬁnal stage of the simulation, the .INP ﬁle generated by MATLAB, which
speciﬁes settings for various control elements, is used to initiate another execution
of EPANET, closing the physical-cyber-physical loop. The process can be repeated
as necessary to simulate operation of the WDN over multiple cycles of cyber control.
Figure C.3 shows the ﬁle resulting from execution of the water allocation algorithm
for the node groups of Fig. C.1.
The result of executing EPANET with the .INP ﬁle generated by MATLAB is
shown in Fig. C.4. As an example of the manifestation of cyber control, the ﬂow in
the link connecting Junction1 (J1) and SOURCE, marked with an arrow, has been
reduced from 75-100 gpm (yellow) in Fig. C.1 to 50-75 gpm (green) in Fig. C.4.
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Figure C.3: EPANET input ﬁle generated by MATLAB.

Figure C.4: Complex topology after applying cyber control.

APPENDIX D
INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFICACY OF DATA RETRIEVAL FROM A
FAULT MITIGATION DATABASE
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The premise underlying the automated failure mitigation proposed in this dissertation is that a database is available that associates a set of countermeasures with a
set of failure types. In this appendix, we utilize rank-weight-biased precision (RWBP)
to measure the eﬀectiveness of data retrieval from such a database, in the hope of
determining practices most likely to lead to an eﬃcacious search. The work described
here will be submitted in August 2011 to the Track on Dependable and Adaptive
Distributed Systems (DADS) of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [19].

D.1 MOTIVATION
What we have presented in [11] and [14] are the semantic agents and SSM
model, which allow us to interpret the semantics in the data stream and reconcile
heterogeneity in the semantics in the query. One of the greatest beneﬁt lying in SSM
model is the tolerance of imprecise query on the failures. When an imprecise query
is interpreted, the embedded information of failure is classiﬁed on certain position on
the taxonomy (a type of ontology) of failure type database, as shown in 4.8 and measured by SDM in 3.15. Once the failure type has been identiﬁed, the corresponding
mitigation techniques can be found by the help of ontology reasoning [17]. The failure
can have a large number of available mitigation techniques, if it locates at the higher
level on the taxonomy, such as a broad category like a “NodeFail”. On the other
hand, a speciﬁc failure type can have very limited number of mitigation techniques,
if it locates at lower level on the taxonomy, such as “ExceedTotalHead” at the root
of failure type database.
SSM model can greatly reduce the heterogeneity in the useful semantic information extracted from raw data collected by sensor. The performance evaluation of
SSM has been extensively discussed in Section 3.4, but limited discussion is carried
on the precision of the interpretation, i.e. how much uncertainty incurred when the
failure is classiﬁed on the taxonomy.

106

Both of the failure type taxonomy and the mitigation technique taxonomy
discussed in Section 4 are represented by set of data and stored in database. As
a CPS is a purely automatic system without human intervention, we assume that
system takes the role of human operator completely. The system can automatically
interpret the query, classify the failure type on the predeﬁned taxonomy, scan the
mitigation technique in the mitigation database according to the identiﬁed failure
type, stop at one mitigation technique and select it as the appropriate one for the
failure type. As discussed above, based on the semantics in the query, when the
classiﬁcation of failure on the taxonomy has reached certain level on the taxonomy, a
relatively narrow data pool with multiple mitigation techniques are associated with
one failure type. Each mitigation technique can be abstracted as data in the database,
with diﬀerent usefulness to resolve that particular failure characterized in diﬀerent
weight. The system needs to select which data is a good solution and decides when
to stop retrieving the data from the pool. The system does not necessarily look for
all the data available in the data pool, as it can not feasibly seek all data in a large
mitigation database (more than one million data) for a high-level failure.
The quantiﬁcation of the lost reliability due to the acceptance of imprecise
queries, which add more uncertainty in the complex CPSs, is not discussed in this
section. What we focus on is the process beyond the point that one failure type has
been identiﬁed on the taxonomy of failures, and we investigate at the eﬀectiveness of
data retrieval when the system selects the available option from data pool. Figure
D.1 depicts the scenario about how system selects the available mitigation technique
to address an identiﬁed failure in the failure database. It shows that SSM resolves the
problem of imprecise query but introduces the uncertainty. After a failure is identiﬁed,
the system starts to automatically select the available mitigation technique from the
database. The distribution of the available mitigation techniques and the usefulness
of each data are unknown by the system.
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Figure D.1: Unreliability introduced in the imprecise query and data selection.

In this section, we measured the eﬀectiveness of data retrieval in the mitigation
search-and-selection phase, given diﬀerent data distribution cases and search ways.
The simulation reveals how to conﬁgure the system can result in a cost-eﬀective
search, which is quite meaningful as the determination of the selected data is the
ﬁnal stage of the “query-retrieval” process. The empirical result can facilitate more
eﬀective conﬁguration of the system for automatic operation. Because selection is a
random process, a statistical model is suitable to capture the uncertainty in the data
retrieval phase. We utilized the theory developed for the information retrieval system
in [54] to capture the uncertainty in this process.

D.2 BACKGROUND ON INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
Information retrieval system needs to compute a score to represent the degree
of satisfaction between the selected data and a query. Speciﬁcally, each score is a
numeric estimation about the probability that how much the selected data matches
with the information (semantics) embedded in the query. The semantics in the query
have been interpreted by SSM, and on the basis of the selected failure, we can quantify
the eﬀectiveness of data selected from mitigation database. All the available data has
an associated weight.
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The two notations in the information retrieval theory are total number of
relevant documents for the query (R) and total number of retrieved documents (d ).
Here, a document refers to a single data in the database, and we use it in the remaining
part of this section to conform to the terminology in information-retrieval theory. It
is often the case that R is larger than d, which implies that system can only feasibly
check part of the relevant documents rather than all of the documents that match
with system’s query.
The recall and precision are the two well-known elementary notations for measurement. Their deﬁnitions are illustrated as Fig. D.2. Recall is the proportion of
the relevant documents that have been retrieved, i.e. C/R, while precision is the
proportion of retrieved documents that are relevant, i.e. C/d. These two concepts
tend to be in tension.

Figure D.2: Retrieved vs. relevant information in database.

Most of the existing studies towards the information retrieval eﬀectiveness
measure the average precision (AP), precision at d documents retrieved (P@d), Rprecision (P@R) and reciprocal rank (RR). All these measurements require the knowledge of R, which is unknown in some cases. Besides, the existing measurement methods have shortcomings due to other two facts: i)complete relevance judgments are
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impractical in current system and the recall tends to be overestimated; ii)recall, as
an overall evaluation of relevant documents, does not capture the notions that the
system selects data randomly and the behavior of search can stop at any relevant
document.
Given a document ranking, i.e. the sequence of documents, we use rank-weightbiased precision (RWBP) to measure the data retrieval eﬀectiveness in the system.
The beneﬁts are summarized as follows:
1. It measures the rate at which data usefulness is gained by a system working
at a given degree of persistence, measured by advanced probability p that the
system continues to search for the next relevant data. The higher the degree of
persistence, the more data that the system will look for before stops and selects
the data. The probability of continuous searching can be previously conﬁgured
in the system.
2. By adjusting the persistence p, a parameter (RWBP) that represents the eﬃciency of system searching behavior has the advantage of capturing the critical
facets of other measurements, including AP, RR and P@d.
3. RWBP allows quantiﬁcation of eﬀectiveness when only partial relevance judgments are available, speciﬁcally, the system does not need to query all the
relevant data residing in the database.
4. RWBP takes the weight of each data into consideration.

D.3 MODEL
For the intelligent WDN case, all the available mitigation techniques for all
types of failures reside in the database in parallel, i.e. there is no priority to retrieve
any one of them when the system performs searching automatically. We suppose the
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data retrieval is performed like a scan from left to right as shown in Fig. D.3. The
system only has an identiﬁed failure type, and has no awareness of the distribution
of the useful mitigation techniques, which are scattered randomly in a huge database
system. The dashed line indicates the available mitigation technique is a weak one
for resolving the failure, while the solid line indicates a strong one.

Figure D.3: Multiple mitigation techniques for one failure type.

We suppose for each of the mitigation technique, it has an associated eﬃciency value measured by weight (from 0 to 1). The eﬃciency value is evaluated
and assigned by the experts in the design phase of the system beforehand, based on
the previous accumulated experience on the usefulness of one particular mitigation
technique to address a particular failure. Sometimes, certain mitigation technique
can resolve various types of failures, for instance, “Adjust Pressure” can resolve the
failures such as “ExceedPressure” and “PipeBurst”, with diﬀerent eﬃciency. For the
strongest mitigation technique, its utility to the system is 1 (a unit to measure the
eﬀectiveness of the mitigation technique that addresses the failure). For the weakest
or irrelevant one, its utility is 0. The deeper that the system searches through the
ranked documents (the mitigation technique proﬁle), the more utility that the system
can gain. If the total number of researched documents is high, the total utility will
be increased as well.
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Introduction of probability p captures the notion of “expected search length
per desired relevant documents” or “rate at which relevant documents are found”.
We assume that p is a constant for each movement forward. We also assume that
the stop of searching is determined independently of the position in the ranking,
independently of the previous decision, and irrelevant of the weight of the document
just searched. In the intelligent WDN case, the system has no cache for storing the
weight of previous searched results, therefore, it has no sorting process. Given the
advanced probability p of seeking appropriate document in the database, the behavior
of the system is described by the algorithm in Fig. D.4.

{int retrieved_doc = d;
//d is the number of retrieved documents
int relevant_doc = R;
//R is the number of relevant documents
if R < d
d-- until d <=R; //We suppose that the number of
//retrieved documents in query should be less than the
//available relevant documents in the system

int i;
double w;
double p;
double U = 0;

//Start seeking the relevant document
//counter of the retrieved documents
//weight of mitigation technique to address failure
//proceeding probability
//total utilities of the retrieved documents

for (i = 1;;i <= d;)
{
if i++,
// counter increases to proceed retrieval
then proceed to view next doc in the ranked list with p;
if w > 0,
//indicate the mitigation technique is useful
add the utility of mitigation technique into
total utility U with associated probability p;
if i stops,
finish searching, calculate utilities;
}
}
//end searching

Figure D.4: System search behavior given advanced probability p.

According to the algorithm in Fig. D.4, the probability that the counter i will
reach to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ document is 𝑝𝑖−1 . On average, the number of documents examined
during each search (N ) can be calculated as Equation D.1:
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∞
∑

𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖−1 ⋅ (1 − 𝑝) =

𝑖=1

1
1−𝑝

(D.1)

The total expected utility (U ) is calculated as Equation D.2:

𝑈=

𝑑
∑

𝑤𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖−1

(D.2)

𝑖=1

The expected rate at which utility is transferred from the automatic searching
service provider is the total utility divided by the average number of searched documents, i.e. the RWBP in Equation D.3. RWBP should be within the range from 0
to 1.

∑𝑑
𝑅𝑊 𝐵𝑃 = 𝑈/𝑁 = ∑𝑑

𝑖=1

𝑖=1

𝑤𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖−1

𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖−1 ⋅ (1 − 𝑝)

(D.3)

D.4 SIMULATION RESULTS
We utilize MATLAB to simulate the searching behavior of the system given
diﬀerent ranks and advanced probabilities.
D.4.1 N, U, RWBP for Four Probabilities of Continuous Search.
We design three diﬀerent ranks and associated weights to observe how the system
behaved.
Initially, we suppose the rank and associated weight as below, with relevant
documents R = 7 and total retrieved documents d = 14. In real application case,
the relevant documents and total retrieved documents can be very large, such as
thousands or millions available documents in the database [54]. However, for a failure
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type that has been identiﬁed in the water distribution case, the number of matched
mitigation techniques are limited, and R = 7 is a reasonable assumption.
Ranking1: -♣-♣♣-♣♣♣-♣– (♣ represents relevant document)
Weight1 of each: [0, 0.1, 0, 0.3, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 0 ,0.7, 0, 0]
The rank shows that the distribution of relevant documents is quite even.
Given four diﬀerent probabilities, p1 = 0.25, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 0.8, p4 =0.95, we can
calculate corresponding average number of documents(N ), total utilities (U ), and
RWBP values.
The average number of documents (N ) is straightforward to be obtained. As
the factor of d goes to inﬁnity, the higher probability, the higher N will be, indicating
the more persistently the system searches, the more documents the system retrieves.
The calculated (N )s are N1 = 1.33, N2 = 2, N3 = 5, N4 = 20.
The results of total utilities for four probabilities are shown in Fig. D.5. As
the number of retrieved documents increases, the higher the probability to continue
searching, the higher the total utilities will be gained. Higher weight has higher
contribution in the total utilities, even though the relevant documents can appear
late.

Figure D.5: Total utilities for weight1.
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RWBP s for four probabilities during simulation are shown as Fig. D.6. When
p = 0.25 and p = 0.5, the variation of RWBP is similar. RWBP in p = 0.5 is always
higher than the one in p = 0.25, almost twice after d = 3. When p reaches 0.8,
RWBP begins to surpass the one in p = 0.5 when d = 4, but even less the one in
p = 0.25 before d reaches 4. As p approaches to 0.95, RWBP is the lowest among
all the four cases, but starts to surpass the one in p = 0.5 when d = 9, and it is
anticipated that it has a tendency to surpass RWBP in p = 0.8 at certain d. This
tells us that, for an evenly-distributed rank, a low advanced probability might be
more cost-eﬀective for the case that system searches at shallow depth, such as the
ﬁrst 5 documents. As system continues seeking for more documents, a relatively
high advanced probability contributes higher eﬀectiveness. In brief, this advanced
probability should be conﬁgured at a moderate value, given the length of the rank.
If the rank is not long, a high advanced probability is not cost-eﬀective.

Figure D.6: RWBP values for weight1.

Then, we design rank2 that relevant documents appear late. In this case, R
= 7, d = 14, and the weight for each relevant one remain the same.
Ranking2: —–♣♣♣-♣-♣♣♣ (♣ represents relevant document)
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Weight2 of each: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.4, 0.8, 0.7]
The calculation of N remains the same. Simulation results for total utilities
U are shown in Fig. D.7.

Figure D.7: Total utilities for weight2.

The total utilities start to grow once the relevant document is detected. Same
as case in rank1, as d increases, the total utilities start to grow along with the detection of relevant documents. The ﬁnal U for each probability is U1 =0.00020233,
U2 =0.0126, U3 =0.3709 and U4 =1.7923, respectively. Compared with the U in
rank1, they are lower. It shows that the distribution of relevant documents can aﬀect
total utilities, i.e. the later the relevant documents appear, the lower total utilities
will be. Therefore, to increase the eﬃciency of data retrieval by increasing total
utilities, the relevant documents should appear at earlier positions in the rank.
Simulation result for RWBP given rank2 is as Fig. D.8. The RWBP for
each probability is RWBP1 = 0.00015175, RWBP2 =0.0063, RWBP3 =0.0891 and
RWBP4 =0.5242, respectively.
Generally speaking, compared with the RWBP s in rank1, they are lower. This
is because N remains the same, but the total utilities decrease. As the relevant
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Figure D.8: RWBP values for weight2.

documents appear late, the RWBP that captures the rate at which relevant documents
are found slows down. Note that the interpretation of precision scores needs to be
tempered by knowledge of R, the number of relevant documents. Similar as case of
rank1, RWBP in the most-persistent system (p=0.95) has not started to lead the
value until d is larger than 12. Since a persistent system (p = 0.95) is guaranteed
to obtain a low expected utility from a search with only a few relevant documents.
Non-persistent system will also obtain low RWBP scores if none of the initial few
documents are relevant. Diﬀerent from the case in rank1, RWBP for non-persistent
system (for p is less than 0.5) is lower than the one in persistent system, from the
moment when the ﬁrst relevant document is detected.
Finally, we change the rank and weight as below, and name it as rank3. It
represents the case that the relevant documents appear early. In this case, R = 7, d
= 14, and the weight for each relevant one remains the same.
Ranking3: ♣♣♣♣—-♣♣-♣– (♣ represents relevant document)
Weight3 of each: [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0.8, 0, 0.7, 0, 0]
N is the same as rank1 and rank2. Simulation result for total utilities U is
in Fig. D.9. The U for each probability is U1 = 0.2094, U2 = 0.4035, U3 = 0.9970
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and U4 = 2.1755, respectively. Compared with RWBP s in rank1, they are higher. It
justiﬁes the analysis for the vice-versa case that the relevant documents appear late.

Figure D.9: Total Utilities for weight3.

Simulation result for RWBP in weight 3 is as Fig. D.10.

Figure D.10: RWBP values for weight3.

Compared with RWBP in rank1 and rank1, the diﬀerence is distinct. Generally speaking, the value of RWBP s in this case are much higher, and the non-persistent
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system has the highest eﬀectiveness. For persistent system, even the advance probability p = 0.8 is slightly higher than p = 0.95, the RWBP for the previous probability
is more than twice of the RWBP for the latter. The simulation result reveals that,
for a rank that relevant documents appear early, the system can just select the initial
relevant documents and then gain relatively high eﬀectiveness.
As relevant documents appear less frequently in later positions, the total utilities slow down to increase, and the amount of increased RWBP decreases. For
non-persistent system, RWBP reaches to stable value since d = 4, whereas the persistent system has potential to drastically improve RWBP even after d = 8. RWBP
for p = 0.8 surpasses the one for p = 0.5 after d = 8.
D.4.2 Simulation Results for Conditional Search.

We add the con-

ditional probability of advancement, subjected to whether the previous examined
document is relevant. If the previous document is relevant, the probability to proceed to next one is p1 and we assume it as p1 = 0.4; if not relevant, the advanced
probability is p2 and we assume it as p2 = 0.9. In comparison, for the unconditional
search, we assume p = 0.5.
Given weight1, we can simulate the number of searched documents for at each
d, based on the expected number of retrieved documents as following Equation D.4:

𝑁 (𝑑) =

𝑑
∑

𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖−1 ⋅ (1 − 𝑝)

(D.4)

𝑖=1

The simulation result for N is as Fig. D.11.
For the unconditional case, the ﬁnalized number of examined documents is
higher, whereas number of examined documents in the conditional case grows steadily.
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Figure D.11: N for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight1.

It indicates that, even the conditional probability is higher when the previous document is irrelevant, the persistent system without condition (p = 0.5) still has searched
more documents on average.
Simulation result for U according to Equation D.2 is as Fig. D.12.

Figure D.12: U for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight1.
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For the unconditional case, the total utility is higher than the one in conditional
case. Again, on average, the system that searches documents without constraints on
the previous document still gain higher total utilities.
Simulation result for RWBP according to Equation D.3 is as Fig. D.13.

Figure D.13: RWBP for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight1.

RWBP of unconditional search is much more steadily-growing and higher than
that in conditional search. RWBP is changing dramatically according to the positions
of relevant documents. This is mainly because, the average number of examined
documents N are quite diﬀerent given the previous document is relevant or not. If the
previous document is relevant, then N is 1/(1-p1) = 1.67, whereas if it is not relevant,
N = 10. Because of Equation D.3, RWBP has much greater transition whenever the
previous document is not relevant. The result proves that a high advanced probability
indeed can improve the data retrieval eﬀectiveness given the previous document is not
relevant. The weight of each document does not provide much contribution in the
discussion here.
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Secondly, we investigate the case in rank2. Given weight2, the simulation result
for N at each d is as Fig. D.14.

Figure D.14: N for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight2.

Similar to rank1, the average number of examined documents is lower in the
conditional case than in the unconditional case. As the relevant documents appear
late, N changes late in conditional case, whereas the change of N becomes minor and
steady in unconditional case.
Simulation result for U is as Fig. D.15. Total utilizes start to increase in
both cases after relevant documents have been detected. However, the total utility
in unconditional case is 6 times higher than the one in conditional case, whereas in
rank1, the diﬀerence is smaller than double times. And U in rank2 is much smaller
than the one in rank1, particularly, U for unconditional case in rank1 is 10 times
larger than the one in rank2. It shows that, even in the same weights, if the relevant
documents appear late, the total utilities can be greatly aﬀected.
Simulation result for RWBP is as Fig. D.16.
Similar to the situation in rank1, the eﬀectiveness in unconditional case is
steadily increasing, while the one in conditional case varies subjected to the position
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Figure D.15: U for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight2.

Figure D.16: RWBP for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight2.

of irrelevant documents. Compared with the values of RWBP in rank1, the one in
rank2 is much smaller, speciﬁcally, the RWBP in rank1 is about 1000 times of the
one in rank2. This again shows that the eﬀectiveness of data retrieval can greatly
deteriorate in the rank where relevant documents appear late.
Finally, we investigate the case in rank3. Subjected to weight3, the simulation
result for N is as Fig. D.17.
As the relevant documents appear early, N is higher in conditional case than
the one in the unconditional case, but the value in unconditional case still grows more
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Figure D.17: N for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight3.

steadily. The average number of searched documents in rank3 are higher than both
the ones in rank1 and rank2.
Simulation result for U is as Fig. D.18.
The values of total utilities in conditional case are still lower than the one in
unconditional case. But in rank3, both of them grow steadily and are much higher
the corresponding values in rank1 and rank2.
Simulation result for RWBP is as Fig. D.19.
In rank3, as the relevant documents appear early, RWBP in both cases starts
to grow at the beginning. This is due to the fact that the U grows more faster
than N grows at ﬁrst 4 relevant documents. RWBP in unconditional case reaches to
stable value around 0.2 after d = 4, whereas RWBP in conditional case drops sharply
when irrelevant documents appear. In rank3, the amount of variation in RWBP is
the largest one among the three ranks, and the highest value can be almost 40 times
larger than the lowest one. The eﬀectiveness in rank3 is better than rank1 and rank2,
in both conditional and unconditional cases.
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Figure D.18: U for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight3.

Figure D.19: RWBP for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight3.

In summary, the performance of unconditional case is better than the one of
conditional case, measured by total utilities and eﬀectiveness. The simulation results
build the basis for system conﬁguration to carry on the search task. When the system
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is conﬁgured to seek for the relevant mitigation technique, it is more cost-eﬀective to
conﬁgure the advanced probability to be unconditional in general.
D.4.3 Minimum Depth of Query.

We can calculate the minimum depth

of query (d ) based on the requirement of precision.
A useful consequence of the proposed RWBP metric is that it is possible
to compute upper and lower bounds on eﬀectiveness, even when the knowledge of
ranking and relevance judgments is partial rather than comprehensive in a large
system. With the help of RWBP, it is straightforward to accumulate an uncertainty
value that captures the unknown component of the eﬀectiveness metric.
The simplest case is when the ranking is calculated to a depth of d answers
per query, and the contributions from depth d + 1 on are not available. Then the
uncertainty in the RWBP score is given as following Equation D.5:
Equation D.5:

(1 − 𝑝) ⋅

∞
∑

𝑝

𝑖−1

𝑑

= (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝑝 ⋅

∞
∑

𝑝𝑖−1 = 𝑝𝑑

(D.5)

𝑖=1

𝑖=𝑑+1

The calculation of uncertainty value can be done in advance of any experimentation. For example, with p = 0.25 and a pooling depth of d = 15, the uncertainty
value from all remaining terms in the geometric series is 0.2515 = 9.3132×109 , which
implies the precision that calculated RWBP should be quoted to 10 decimal digits.
Conversely, when four decimal digits of accuracy are required, i.e. the residual should
be less than 0.001, and the required depth to attain this is a function of the value of
p used as Equation D.6:

𝑝𝑑 < 0.001

(D.6)

𝑙𝑛0.001
𝑙𝑛(𝑝)

(D.7)

⇒𝑑>

126

When p = 0.5, p = 0.8, and p = 0.95, this expression suggests minimum
evaluation depth of d = 10, d = 31, and d = 135, respectively. By extending the
depth d of the ranking, we can increase the amount of information taken into account,
which enhance precision in the estimations of eﬀectiveness values.

127

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] E. Lee, “Cyber physical systems: Design challenges,” Proceedings of the 11th
IEEE International Symposium on Object Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing (ISORC ’08), pp. 363–369, May 2008.
[2] J. Sztipanovits, “Composition of cyber-physical systems,” in Proceedings of the
14th Annual IEEE International Conference and Workshops on the Engineering
of Computer-Based Systems (ECBS ’07), (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 3–6, IEEE
Computer Society, Mar. 2007.
[3] P. Pederson, “Critical infrastructure interdependency modeling: The survey of
U.S. and international research,” tech. rep., Idaho National Laboratory, August
2006.
[4] S. M. Rinaldi, “Modeling and simulating critical infrastructures and their interdependencies,” in Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences (HICSS ’04), Jan. 2004.
[5] N. K. Svendsen and S. D. Wolthusen, “Analysis and statistical properties of
critical infrastructure interdependency multiﬂow models,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE Information Assurance and Security Workshop (IAW ’07), pp. 247–254,
June 2007.
[6] C. M. Macal and M. J. North, “Tutorial on agent-based modeling and simulation,” in Proceedings of the 37th Winter Simulation Conference (WSC ’05),
pp. 2–15, Dec. 2005.
[7] C. M. Macal and M. J. North, “Tutorial on agent-based modeling and simulation
part 2: How to model with agents,” in Proceedings of the 38th Winter Simulation
Conference (WSC ’06), pp. 73–83, Dec. 2006.
[8] United States Environmental Protection Agency, “EPANET2 User’s manual.”
http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/wswrd/dw/epanet/EN2manual.PDF, retrieved Jul.
2011.
[9] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “Towards integrated simulation of cyber-physical
systems: a case study on intelligent water distribution,” in Proceedings of the 8th
IEEE International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC ’09), (Chengdu, China), pp. 690 –695, Dec. 2009.
[10] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “A general framework for quantitative modeling
of dependability in cyber-physical systems: A proposal for doctoral research,”
in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Computer Software and
Applications Conference (COMPSAC ’09), vol. 1, (Seattle, USA), pp. 668 –671,
Jul. 2009.

128

[11] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “Modeling cyber-physical systems with semantic agents,” in Proceedings of the 5th IEEE Workshop on Engineering Semantic
Agent Systems (ESAS), in conjunction with the 34th IEEE International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC ’10), (Seoul, South Korea), Jul. 2010.
[12] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “A semantic agent framework for cyber-physical
systems,” in Semantic Agent Systems: Foundations and Applications (A. Elci,
M. T. Kone, and M. A. Orgun, eds.), Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[13] J. Lin and S. Sedigh, “Qualitative and quantitative modeling of reliability for
intelligent water distribution networks,” Special Issue on Performance and Dependability Modeling of Dynamic Systems of the International Journal of Performability Engiineering, vol. 358, no. 10, 2011.
[14] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Hurson, “An agent-based approach to reconciling data
heterogeneity in cyber-physical systems,” in Proceedings of the 20th International
Heterogeneity in Computing Workshop (HCW), in conjunction with the 25th
IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS ’11),
(Anchorage, AK), May 2011.
[15] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “Investigating the application of game theory
to resource allocation in cyber physical systems,” in Proceedings of the 44th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-44), (Kauai, HI),
Jan. 2011.
[16] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “Integrated cyber-physical simulation of intelligent water distribution networks,” in Matlab/Book2 (E. P. Leite, ed.), Intech,
2011, to appear.
[17] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Hurson, “Ontologies and decision support for failure
mitigation in intelligent water distribution networks,” in Proceedings of the 45th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-45), (Maui, HI),
Jan. 2012, under review.
[18] J. Lin and S. Sedigh, “An ontology-based framework for decision support in
intelligent water distribution networks,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and
Data Engineering (TKDE), to be submitted in Aug. 2011.
[19] J. Lin and S. Sedigh, “Quantifying the eﬀectiveness of automated failure mitigation in intelligent water distribution networks,” in 7th Track on Dependable and
Adaptive Distributed Systems (DADS) of the 27th ACM Symposium on Applied
Computing (SAC ’12), (Riva del Garda, Trento, Italy), to be submitted in Aug.
2011.
[20] T. Rigole and G. Deconinck, “A survey on modeling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructures,” in Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Benelux Young Researchers Symposium on Electrical Power Engineering, (Ghent, Belgium), pp. 27–
28, Apr. 2006.

129

[21] M. de C. Gatti, C. de Lucena, and J. Briot, “On fault tolerance in law governed multi-agent systems,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop
on Software Engineering for Large-Scale Multi-Agent Systems (SELMAS ’06),
May 2006.
[22] B. Bauer and J. Odell, “UML 2.0 and agents: How to build agent based systems
with the new UML standard,” Engineering Applications of Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
vol. 18, no. 2, 2005.
[23] A. Faza, S. Sedigh, and B. McMillin, “Reliability analysis for the advanced electric power grid: from cyber control and communication to physical manifestations
of failure,” in Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Computer
Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP ’09), Sep. 2009.
[24] Y. Y. Haimes, B. M. Horowitz, J. H. Lambert, J. R. Santos, C. Lian, and K. G.
Crowther, “Inoperability input-output model (IIM) for interdependent infrastructure sectors: theory and methodology,” Journal of Infrastructure Systems,
vol. 11, pp. 67–79, June 2005.
[25] G. Jiang, W. Chung, and G. Cybenko, “Semantic agent technologies for tactical
sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the SPIE, pp. 311–320, Sep. 2003.
[26] J. Liu and F. Zhao, “Towards semantic services for sensor-rich information systems,” in 2nd International Conference on Broadband Networks, pp. 44–51, Oct.
2005.
[27] A. Elci and B. Rahnama, “Consideration on a new software architecture for
distributed environments using autonomous semantic agents,” in Proceedings of
the 29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference
(COMPSAC ’05), Jul. 2005.
[28] J. E. Kim and D. Mosse, “Generic framework for design, modeling, and simulation of cyber physical systems,” ACM SIGBED Review, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–2,
2008.
[29] A. Al-Hammouri, V. Liberatore, H. Al-Omari, Z. Al-Qudah, M. S. Branicky,
and D. Agrawal, “A co-simulation platform for actuator networks,” in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
(SenSys ’07), pp. 383–384, Nov. 2007.
[30] M. W. Bright, A. R. Hurson, and S. Pakzad, “Automated resolution of semantic heterogeneity in multidatabases,” ACM Transactions on Databases Systems,
vol. 19, Jun. 1994.
[31] Y. Jiao and A. R. Hurson, “Mobile agents in mobile data access systems,” in Proceedings of the Confederated International Conferences DOA,
CoopIS and ODBASE 2002 On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems,
DOA/CoopIS/ODBASE ’02, (London, UK), pp. 144–162, Springer-Verlag, 2002.

130

[32] Y. Jiao and A. R. Hurson, “Mobile agents and energy-eﬃcient multidatabase
design,” in Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA ’04), vol. 1, pp. 255 – 260, 2004.
[33] S. Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press,
1996.
[34] T. R. Gruber, “Towards principles for the design of ontologies used for knowledge
sharing,” International Journal Human-Computer Studies, vol. 43, Nov. 1995.
[35] J. J. Jung and J. Euzenat, “Towards semantic social networks,” in Proceedings
of the 4th European Semantic Web Conference, pp. 267–280, 2007.
[36] I. Cantador and P. Castells, “Multilayered semantic social network modeling by
ontology-based user proﬁles clustering: Application to collaborative ﬁltering,”
in Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Managing Knowledge in
a World of Networks, Springer Verlag Lectures Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
2006.
[37] J. Golbeck and M. Rothstein, “Linking social networks on the web with FOAF: A
semantic web case study,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference
on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Jul. 2008.
[38] P. Mika, “Flink: Semantic web technology for the extraction and analysis of social
networks,” Journal of Web Semantics, vol. 3, 2005.
[39] H. Alani, S. Dasmahapatra, K. O’Hara, and N. Shadbolt, “Identifying communities of practice through ontology network analysis,” IEEE Intelligent Systems,
vol. 18, no. 2, 2003.
[40] V. Paola, N. Roberto, and C. Alessandro, “A new content-based model for social
network analysis,” in Proceedings of the 2th IEEE International Conference on
Semantic Computing, Aug. 2008.
[41] E. Miguela, P. Patro, K. E. Brown, Y. R. Petillot, and D. M. Lane, “Semantic
knowledge-based framework to improve the situation awareness of autonomous
underwater vehicles,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering,
vol. 23, May 2011.
[42] C. M.Macal and M. J. North, “Tutorial on agent-based modeling and simulation
Part 2: How to model with agents,” in Proceedings of the 38th Winter Simulation
Conference (WSC ’06), pp. 73–83, 2006.
[43] L. R. Phillips, H. Link, R. Smith, and L. Weiland, “Agent-based control of distributed infrastructure resources,” tech. rep., Sandia National Laboratories, Jan.
2006.

131

[44] Argonne National Laboratory, “Recursive porous agent simulation toolkit manual.” http://repast.sourceforge.net/docs/tutorial/SIM/index.html, retrieved Jul. 2011.
[45] K. S. Trivedi and R. Sahner, “SHARPE at the age of twenty two,” SIGMETRICS
Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 52–57, 2009.
[46] FMEA-FMECA.com, “Failure mode and eﬀects analysis.” http://www.
fmeainfocentre.com/, retrieved Jul. 2011.
[47] Cambridge Information Group, “Cambridge scientiﬁc abstracts.” http://www.
csa.com/, retrieved Jul. 2011.
[48] C. Byrne and S. A. McCracken, “An adaptive thesaurus employing semantic
distance, relational inheritance and post-coordination for linguistic support of
information search and retrieval.,” Journal of Information Science, vol. 25, no. 2,
pp. 113–131, 1999.
[49] Stanford University, “Protégé.” http://protege.stanford.edu/, retrieved Jul.
2011.
[50] W. Recommendation, “Owl web ontology language reference.” http://www.w3.
org/TR/owl-ref/, retrieved Feb. 2011.
[51] Isograph, “Fault tree analysis.” http://www.faulttree.org/, retrieved Jul.
2011.
[52] ReSIST Project, “Resist resilience for survivability in IST.” http://www.
rkbexplorer.com/explorer/, retrieved Jul. 2011.
[53] K. S. Trivedi, D. S. Kim, A. Roy, and D. Medhi, “Dependability and security
models(keynote paper),” in 7th International Workshop on Design of Reliable
Communication Networks (DRCN ’09), pp. 11–20, Oct. 2009.
[54] A. Moﬀat and J. Zobel, “Rank-biased precision for measurement of retrieval
eﬀectiveness,” ACM Transactions on Information Systems, vol. 27, Dec. 2008.

132

VITA

Jing Lin was born in Chengdu, China on November 5, 1982. In June 2005, she
received her BSc. in Communication Engineering from the University of Electrical
Science and Technology of China (UESTC), in Chengdu, China. In December 2007,
she received her M.S. in Software Engineering from the UESTC. She started working
toward her Ph.D. in Computer Engineering at the Missouri University of Science and
Technology (formerly the University of Missouri-Rolla) in January 2008, and received
the degree by December 2011.

